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ABSTRACT
Ikusan, Ademola A. M.S.C.S., Department of Computer Science, Wright State University, 2017.
Collaboratively Detecting HTTP-based Distributed Denial of Service Attack using Software De-
fined Network.
Over the years, there have been a lot of attacks on the web servers of critical companies
and organization. As much as these organizations tighten their security, it always tends not
to be enough to stop all the attacks towards their servers. These attack vectors are so diffi-
cult to stop because of the technicalities behind the attack. Furthermore, there are different
classes of distributed denial of service(DDoS) attacks such as the high rates (SYN Flood
attacks, ARP Flood attacks, etc), low-rate(HTTP-GET, HTTP-POST). Although there are
different ways to stop high rate DDoS attacks by traffic sampling and detecting malformed
packets and unsolicited request by using stateful firewalls and other security sensors, but
with low rate DDoS attacks it is different. The attack is a carefully crafted denial of service
attacks that tend to evade known security tools out there. Aside that, the traditional net-
working architecture is very rigid and it makes it very difficult for new ideas or innovations
that can help solve this problem, but in recent years, there have been talks about a new
networking paradigm, which is Software Defined Networking (SDN); this paradigm brings
the possibility to program your network which allows more innovative idea to enter into the
networking world in ways not seen before. This thesis proposes a solution to the problem
of attacks that are difficult for security sensors to detect or prevent by using some of the
powerful features of Software Defined Networking to mitigate this attack. This project is
capable of mitigating against HTTP-GET attacks, the initial testing has a successful out-
come in stopping attacks from known attack tools used to launch these attacks and also
with a good prospect as per future improvements in making it cover more attack vectors
and robust.
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Introduction
In this thesis, a solution is proposed that can analyze the traffic of a network and detect
malicious traffic from bots and stopping the traffic. In specific, we will discuss the HTTP
GET Attack, the effect of this attack on Web servers, why this attack is difficult to stop,
what it relies on and how it is been used by attackers to disrupt the service of organizations
that are critical to serving people. We will demonstrate how we use behavioral analysis to
analyze the traffic in the network with the use of the features of Software Defined Network-
ing; to stop malicious traffic from further degradation of the service.
1.1 Motivation
In this era, where attacks are targeted towards system that are mostly used, like in
the case of when Microsoft’s Operating System which is Windows is the most targeted
operating system because of the population of people that use this operating system, this
also applies to mobile phones and other technological devices used by huge population of
people. In a way to make services more accessible, these services were moved to the web
in order to cater for people’s needs. Shopping sites, Online gaming, Bloggers, Vloggers,
Social Media sites, etc. Due to the increased traffic in the internet to critical applications
that have been moved to the internet, there has been an increased number of threat in the
internet. Especially for sites that are used by a lot of people such as Facebook, Twitter,
Amazon, Ebay, Wordpress, Sony, etc. are a few among targeted sites and even security
agencies like the CIA server, etc.
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Also in recent years there has been an increase in denial of service attacks which is a
consequence of critical applications moved to web-based systems. These denial of service
attacks come in different forms Denial of service attacks represent an enormous danger to
the Internet and there are numerous tools that have been developed to combat these attacks.
Attackers continually use different ways due to way the Internet is built. The Internet was
not built with security in mind, but with performance in mind. There are numerous ways
to launch a denial of service attack and a frequently used one is the attacker send a flow of
packers to a targeted victim; this flow consumes critical resources of the system, thereby
making it unavailable for benign or legitimate users[3]. Another way us for the attacker
to send malformed packets that disrupts the normal use of an application or protocol on
a victim’s machine, which forces the machine to shut down or freeze. An ever-increasing
number of critical applications are moving to web-based systems as developers attempt to
create applications that can be utilized on a wide range of devices via a web browser. As
a consequence, this vast adoption of web services and they are uses make them targets and
they are vulnerable and these vulnerabilities are exploitable by attackers.
Distributed Denial of Service attack is one of the notable attacks on Web servers,
some of this DDoS attacks are SYN-Flood, HTTP Application DDoS attacks. They are
performed by overwhelming the web server in numerous ways by sending invalid data as
input or flooding the web server with automated request causing either a crash, or causing
benign users from getting services they need. These attacks can be categorized into volume
attack; protocol attack; and application layer attack. With the rate at which DDoS attacks
are used in denying benign users of services, this can help to investigate and find solution to
the other types of DDoS attacks. This will also help to mitigate against HTTP-GET attack.
Software Defined Networking has shown promising features that can be used to produce
solution to DDoS attacks because of its various flexibility capabilities.
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1.2 Background
Several terms and techniques are utilized in this work which one needs to be famil-
iar with, so below is some background information about these terms, architectures and
techniques.
1.2.1 Software Defined Networking
Software Defined Networking (SDN) was originally coined to represent the ideas and
work around OpenFlow at Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA. As originally defined,
SDN refers to a network architecture where the forwarding state in the data plane is man-
aged by a remotely controlled plane decoupled from the former. The networking industry
has on many occasions shifted from the this original view of SDN by referring to any-
thing that involves software as being SDN. We therefore attempt to provide a much less
ambiguous definition of SDN. SDN therefore is a network architecture with four (4) core
components;[1]
Firstly, the control and data planes are decoupled. Control functionality is removed
from network devices that will become simple (packet) forwarding elements.
Secondly, forwarding decisions are flow based, instead of destination based. A flow
is broadly defined by a set of packet field values acting as a match (filter) criterion and
a set of actions (instructions). In the SDN/OpenFlow context, a flow is a sequence of
packet between source and a destination[11]. All packets of a flow receive identical service
policies at the forwarding devices. The flow abstraction allows unifying the behavior of
different types of network devices, including routers, switches, firewalls and middleboxes.
Flow programming enables unprecedented flexibility, limited only to the capabilities of the
implemented flow tables[1].
Thirdly, control logic is moved to an external entity, the so-called SDN controller or
NOS (Networking Operating System). The NOS is a software platform that runs on com-
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modity server technology and provides the essential resources and abstractions to facilitate
the programming of forwarding devices based on the logically centralized abstract network
view. Its purpose is therefore similar to that of a traditional operating system.
Lastly, the network is programmable through software applications running on top
of the NOS that interacts with the underlying data plane devices. This is a fundamental
characteristics of SDN, considered as its main value proposition[1].
It is worth noting that the logical centralization of the control logic, especially, of-
fers a lot of benefits. First, it is simpler and less error prone to modify network policies
through high-level languages and software components, compared with low-level device
specific configurations. Secondly, a control program can automatically react to spurious
changes of the network state and this maintain the high-level policies intact. Furthermore,
the centralization of the control logic in a controller with global knowledge of the network
state simplifies the development of more sophisticated networking functions, services and
applications[1].
Following the explicit explanation above, SDN can be defined by three fundamental
abstractions: forwarding, distribution and specification. For the fact that abstractions are
essential tools of research in computer science and information technology, being already
an all-round feature for many computer architectures and frameworks. The forwarding
abstraction allows any forwarding behavior desired by the network application (the con-
trol program written in high level languages) while hiding the details of the underlying
hardware[1]. OpenFlow is one actualization of such abstraction which can be seen as the
device driver in an operating system. The distribution abstraction should shield SDN ap-
plications from the vagaries of distributed state, making the distributed control problem a
logically centralized one. Its realization requires a common distribution layer, which in
SDN resides in the NOS. This layer has two essential functions. First, it is responsible
for installing the control commands on the forwarding devices. Second, it collects status
information about the forwarding layer (network devices and links), to offer a global net-
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work view to network applications. Lastly, specification abstraction which should allow a
network application to express the desired network behavior without being responsible for
implementing that behavior itself. This can be achieved through virtualization solutions,
as well as network programming languages. These approaches map the abstract configura-
tions that the applications express based on a simplified, abstract model of the network, into
a physical configuration for the global network view exposed by the SDN controller[1].
As mentioned earlier, the strong coupling between the control and data plane has
made it difficult to add a new functionality to traditional networks. The coupling of the
control and data planes (and its physical embedding in the network elements) makes the
development and deployment of new networking features very difficult, since it would
imply a modification of the control plane of all network devices through the installation of
new firmware and in some cases, hardware upgrades; that is why new features introduced
is always expensive, hard to configure and specialized such as firewalls, IDS/IPS, Load
balancers, etc. These middle-boxes need to be placed strategically in the network making
it harder to later change the network topology, configuration and functionality[1].
In contrast, SDN decouples the control plane from the network devices and becomes
an external entity: the NOS or SDN Controller. There are advantages to this kind of setup,
some are;
• It becomes easier to program these applications since the abstractions provided by
the control platform and/or the network programming languages can be shared.
• All applications can take advantage of the same network information (the ominous
view of the network), leading to more consistent and effective policy decisions, while
reusing control plane software modules.
• These applications can take actions (i.e. reconfigure forwarding devices) from any
part of the network. There is therefore no need to devise a precise strategy about the
location of the new functionality.
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• The integration of different application becomes straightforward. For example the
load balancing and routing application can be combined sequentially, with load bal-
ancing having a precedence over routing policies. This makes the network smarter
than the traditional network[1].
The terminologies below help to define the various elements of SDN.
1. Forwarding Devices: These are hardware (OpenFlow Switches, etc) or software
based data plane (OVS) devices that perform a set of elementary operations. The
forwarding devices have well defined instruction sets (e.g. flow rules) used to take
action on the incoming packets (e.g. forward to a specific ports, drop, forward to con-
troller, rewrite some header). These instructions are defined by southbound interfaces
and are installed in the forwarding devices by the SDN controllers implementing the
southbound protocols.
2. Data Plane: Forwarding devices are interconnected through wireless radio channels
or wired cables. The network infrastructure comprises the interconnected forwarding
devices, which represent the data plane.
3. Southbound Interface: The instruction set of the forwarding devices is defined by
the southbound API, which is part of the southbound interface. Furthermore, the
southbound interface also defines the communication protocol between forwarding
devices and control plane elements. This protocol formalizes the way the control and
data plane elements interact.
4. Control Plane: Forwarding devices are programmed by control plane elements through
well defined southbound interface embodiment. The control plane can therefore be
seen as the ”network brain.” All control logic rests in the applications and controllers,
which form the control plane.
6
Figure 1.1: Traditional Architecture vs SDN Architecture
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5. Northbound Interface: The NOS can offer an API to application developers. This
API represents a northbound interface, i.e. a common interface for developing ap-
plications. Typically, a northbound interface abstracts the low-level instruction sets
used by southbound interfaces to program forwarding devices.
6. Management Plane: The management plane is the set of applications that leverage
the functions offered by the northbound interface to implement network control and
operation logic. This includes applications such as routing, firewalls, load balancers,
monitoring and so forth, Essentially, a management application defines the policies,
which are ultimately translated to southbound-specific instructions that program the
behavior of the forwarding devices[1].
As shown in the Figure 1.2 above, which shows a simplified SDN architecture, this
helps to see how each plane interacts with each other and the abstraction from one plane
to the other so as to make it easy to write applications that fits the network per time, as
seen in the diagram that the application written at the Application Layer interacts with the
controller with the API exposed to the Application Layer by the Control Layer, this helps
the programmer to design and program how he/she wants the network to behave and it is
left to the Control Layer which can also be referred to as the NOS to interpret the intention
of the programmer to the Infrastructure Layer which can be called the Data Plane, this
is done with the help of protocols written for proper communication between the Control
Plane to the Data Plane like OpenFlow, etc.
To give more emphasis on the protocol used in communication from the Control Plane
to the Data Plane or Infrastructure Layer, we have to look at OpenFlow and how it works
so as to better understand the system design of the thesis in the next few chapters.
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Figure 1.2: Simplified SDN Architecture
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1.2.2 OpenFlow
OpenFlow is currently the most commonly deployed SDN technology proposed to
standardize the way that a Controller/NOS communicates with the network devices in an
SDN architecture. It was first created at Stanford University in 2008. The Open Networking
Foundation (ONF) is responsible for the update and development of this protocol.
OpenFlow architecture consists of three main components; the data plane which is
composed of the OpenFlow switches, the control plane which consists of one or more
OpenFlow controllers and the control channel, which connects the data plane and the con-
trol plane. The OpenFlow controller manages the data plane by using the control channel
to install flow entries to the flow table in the switches so that the switches can forward the
data packets according to these entries (flow rules). This allows switches to be controlled
by an independent entity. The communication between the switch and controller is often
over a TLS (Transport Layer Security) enabled channel. Based on the specification of each
switch, it must have one or more flow tables that will keep the flow entries specified by the
controller.
A flow entry includes a header that helps to identify the individual flow that the packets
are matched against and set of instructions (actions) that are to be taken by the switch
for these matched packets. The matching is done based on the header fields of the flow.
The action varies depending on the intent of the developer for a particular circumstances,
conditions or scenarios. These actions could be forwarding, drop, further lookups in other
tables as the flow table could be more than one, rewriting the header fields for redirection
or other purposes and etc. As shown in Figure 1.3, it shows the header fields the flow entry
is matched against on the flow table, those fields are shown in Fig 1.3 above, it also shows
some of the actions that can be done on these matched flows additionally you can write
an extension that dictates more actions that was not pre-defined. So to make it very clear,
every flow entry carries the following components;
10
Figure 1.3: OpenFlow Table
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• Match Fields: to match against packets. These consist of the ingress port and packet
headers and optionally metadata specified by a previous table[2].
• Priority: matching precedence of the flow entry[2].
• Counters: updates when packets are matched[2].
• Instructions: to modify the action set or pipeline processing[2].
• Timeouts: maximum amount of time or idle time before flow is expired by the switch.
The timeouts could either be a hard timeout as explained in the former and it could
be an idle timeout as explained in the latter of the timeouts[2].
• Cookie: opaque data value chosen by the controller. May be used by the controller
to filter flow statistics, flow modification and flow deletion. This is not used when
processing packets[2].
The following sections give an overview of the three major components as described
by the OpenFlow protocol specification, which also describes some actual processes that is
being done in practice.
Control Channel
An OpenFlow change needs to begin a control channel with the controller before it can
trade any message with the controller. At the point when the switch has effectively settled
the association, both switch and controller sends an OFPT HELLO message to the next to
arrange the convention adaptation which will therefore be utilized to design the channel. On
the off chance that the recipients concur on the protocol version, at that point the procedure
progresses, generally, the recipient must answer with an OFPT ERROR demonstrating
a failure in agreement. After the switch and the controller have been arranged then both
end-focuses can trade messages over the channel.
12
Data Plane
The data plane works in the establishment level and includes OpenFlow switches.
Its fundamental obligations are information sending and gathering information insights.
This segment will portray how an OpenFlow switch bootstraps its information plane and
how the information sending process functions. Upon the control channel foundation, the
controller and the OpenFlow switch must trade an arrangement of messages all together for
the controller to distinguish and arrange the switch.[2].
Flow Entry Process
After the connection between the switch and the controller has been setup the flow
table of the switch is empty while there has not been any packet sent through the switch. In
the event that an end-point sends data across the network, the switch directly connected to
it does not have the capability to make the decision has to how to route the packet because
it does not have the intelligence to do that, so it turns to the controller to ask the controller
where to route the packet, the message sent to the controller to know what to do with a flow
is called a PACKET IN, the controller inspects this message and decided where the packet
is to go to or what to do with it based on the applications in the application layer of the
SDN infrastructure. As soon as a decision is reached, the controller writes out a message
(flow rule) to the switch called a PACKET OUT to the switch, the switch gets the message
from the controller and installs the flow rule on its flow table, this PACKET OUT however
goes to all switches to reduce redundancy. Depending on the specification of the flow rule,
the switch acts accordingly[2].
OpenFlow Messages
OpenFlow has various messages that guarantees a productive correspondence of plan
between the controller and the switch. These messages can be categorized in to Controller-
to-switch messages, Asynchronous messages and Symmetric messages[2].
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Controller-to-Switch Messages
The controller-to-switch messages such as the PACKET OUT and modify messages
are drafted by the controller and are utilized to arrange the switch, deal with the flow
table and assemble insights about flow entries in the switch flow table. PACKET OUT
messages are sent from the controller to the data plane to infuse the packets generated
by the controller into the data plane. These packets are either raw packet prepared to be
infused into the change to introduce another packet or indicate a local buffer on the switch
containing a raw packet to modify a current flow. FLOW MOD messages are sent from
the controller to the information plane to include, delete or adjust the flow entries in the
switch flow table. To distinguish which flow entries are to be adjusted the FLOW MOD
messages contain a match structure. This match structure has a similar arrangement of the
match structure utilized as a part of coordinating the packets with the incoming packets in
the switch. Data about tables is asked for with the OFMP TABLE multipart request type.
The request does not contain any information in the body. A flow is characterized by a
gathering of packets that offer the same coordinating structure at a specific time interim.
As seen in the reply sent from the switch to the controller flow insights can be viewed based
on three characteristics:
• Received Packets: The number of packets that match the flow passage coordinating
structure.
• Received Bytes: The amount of bytes received by the flow.
• Flow Duration: The time interim a flow entry has been in the flow table since its
underlying establishment. These qualities will be utilized as a part of the underlying
discovery phase of the proposed algorithm l[2].
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Asynchronous Messages
They are messages sent without a controller requesting them from a switch. Switches
send asynchronous messages to controllers to signify a packet arrival, switch state change
or error. The four primary asynchronous messages types are described below:
• PACKET IN: Transfer the control of a packet to the controller, For all packets sent
to the CONTROLLER reserved port using a flow entry or the table-miss flow entry,
a packet-in event is always sent to the controller. Other handling, for example, TTL
checking, may likewise produce packet-in events to send packets to the controller.
Packet-in events generated by an output action in a flow entries or group bucket, it
can be exclusively determined in the yield activity itself, for other packet-in it can be
configured in the switch configuration. If the packet-in event is configured to buffer
packets and the switch has sufficient memory to buffer them, the packet-in events
contain just some portion of the packet header and a buffer ID to be utilized by a
controller when it is prepared for the switch to forward the packet. Switches that
do not support internal buffering, are designed to not buffer packets for the packet-
in event, or have come up short of internal buffering, must send the full packet to
the controller as a feature of the event. Buffered packets will typically be handled
by means of a Packet-out or Flow-mod message from a controller, or automatically
lapsed after sometime. In the event that the packet is buffered, the number of bytes of
the first packet to include in the packet-in can be configured. As a matter of course,
it is 128 bytes. For packet-in created by an output action in a flow entry or group
bucket, it can be indicated independently in the output action itself, for other packet-
in, it can be arranged in the switch setup[2].
• Flow-Removed: Informs the controller about the expulsion of a flow entry from a
flow table. Flow Removed messages are only sent for flow entries with FLOW REM
flag set. They are produced as the consequence of a controller flow delete request or
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the switch flow expiry process when one of the flow timeouts is surpassed[2].
• Port-status: Inform the controller of a change on a port. The switch is required to
send the port-status messages to the controller as port setup or port state changes.
These occasions incorporate change in port setup occasions, for instance in the event
that it was brought down specifically by a client, and port state change occasions, for
instance if the connection went down[2].
• Error: The switch can conform controllers of issues utilizing error messages[2].
Synchronous Messages
Symmetric messages are sent without solicitation, in either direction. The symmetric
messages are as follow:
• Hello: Hello messages are traded between the switch and controller upon association
startup.
• Echo: Echo request/reply messages can be sent from either the switch or the con-
troller and must restore an echo reply. They are the most part used to check the
liveliness of a controller-switch association and should be utilized to quantify its la-
tency or transfer speed.
• Error: Error messages are utilized by the switch or the controller to notify the other
side of the association of problems. They are generally utilized by the switch to
demonstrate a failure of a demand started by the controller.
• Experimenter: Experiment messages give a standard approach to OpenFlow switches
to offer extra usefulness inside the OpenFlow message type space. This is an orga-
nizing range for features meant for future OpenFlow amendments.
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1.2.3 SDN Controllers
Traditional operating systems give abstractions (e.g. high-level programming APIs)
for accessing lower-level devices, deal with the simultaneous access to the basic assets (e.g.
hard drive, network adapter, CPU mmemory) and give security assurance systems. These
functionalities furthermore, assets are key empowering influences for expanded efficiency,
making the life of framework and application engineers less demanding. Their boundless
utilize has fundamentally added to the advancement of different environment (e.g. pro-
gram languages) and the development of a myriad of applications. SDN Controllers in a
software-defined network (SDN) are the brains of the network system. The application
goes about as key control point in the SDN network. There are different SDN Controllers
for SDN and they will be briefly touched here.
NOX/POX
The NOX was developed by Nicira and donated to the research community and hence
becoming open source in 2008. NOX provides a C++ API to OpenFlow (OF v1.0) and
an asynchronous, event-based programming model. NOX is both the first controller and a
part based system for creating SDN applications. It provides support modules specific to
OpenFlow but can and has been extended. The NOX core provides helper methods and
APIs for interacting with OpenFlow switches, including a connection handler and event
engine. [4].
NOX is frequently utilized as a part of scholastic system research to create SDN ap-
plications. One truly cool effect of its boundless scholastic utilize is that illustration code is
accessible for imitating a learning switch and a system wide switch, which can be utilized
as starter code for different programming undertakings and experimentation[4].
Some mainstream NOX applications are SANE and Ethane. SANE is a way to deal
with speaking to the system as a filesystem. Ethane is a Stanford University research appli-
cation for unified, security at the level of a conventional access control list. Both exhibited
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the productivity of SDN by decreasing the lines of code required fundamentally to execute
these capacities that took essentially more code to actualize comparative capacities previ-
ously. In view of this achievement, analysts have been showing MPLS-like applications
over a NOX core[4].
POX is the more up to date, Python-based adaptation of NOX (or NOX in Python).
The thought behind its advancement was to return NOX to its C++ roots and build up a
different Python-based one.
POX asserts the accompanying preferences over NOX:
• POX has a Pythonic OpenFlow interface.
• POX has reusable sample segments for path choice, topology disclosure, and so on.
• POX performs well compared to NOX applications written in Python [4].
Trema
Trema is an OpenFlow programming framework, unlike the more conventional OpenFlow-
centric controllers that preceded it, the Trema demonstrate gives essential framework bene-
fits as a component of its center modules that help (thus) the improvement of client modules
(Trema applications). Engineers can make their client modules in Ruby or C. The main API
the Trema core modules provide to an application is a simple, non-abstracted OpenFlow
driver (an interface to handle all OpenFlow messages).
Fundamentally, a Trema OpenFlow Controller is an extensible arrangement of Ruby
scripts. Engineers can individualize or improve the base controller usefulness by charac-
terizing their own particular controller subclass object and decorating it with extra message
handlers[4].
The base controller design is event-driven and is often compared to the explicit handler
dispatch paradigm of other open source products. In addition, the core modules provide a
message bus (IPC mechanism via Messenger) that allows the applications to communicate
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with each other and core modules (originally in a point-to-point fashion, but migrating to
a publish or subscribe model)[4]. Other core modules include timer and logging libraries,
a packet parser library, and hash-table and linked-list structure libraries. The Trema core
does not provide any state management or database storage structure (these are contained
in the Trema apps and could be a default of memory-only storage using the data struc-
ture libraries)[4]. The infrastructure provides a command-line interface (CLI) and config-
uration filesystem for configuring and controlling applications (resolving dependencies at
load-time), managing messaging and filters, and configuring virtual networksvia Network
Domain Specific Language (DSL, a Trema-specific configuration language).
The appeal of Trema is that it is an all-in-one, simple, modular, rapid prototype and
development environment that yields results with a smaller codebase. The development
environment also includes network/host emulators and debugging tools (integrated unit
testing, packet generation or Wireshark).The Trema applications include a topology dis-
covery and management unit (libtopology), a Path management module (libpath), a load
balancing switch module and a sliceable switch abstraction (that allows the management of
multiple OpenFlow switches). There is also an OpenStack Quantum plug-in available for
the sliceable switch abstraction[4].
A Trema-based OpenFlow controller can interoperate with any element agent that
supports OpenFlow (OF version compatibility aside) and doesnt require a specific agent,
though one of the apps developed for Trema is a software OpenFlow switch (positioned in
various presentations as simpler than OVS)[4].
The individual user modules (Trema applications) publish RESTful interfaces. The
combination of modularity and per-module (or per-application service) APIs, make Trema
more than a typical controller (with a monolithic API for all its services)[4].
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Ryu
Ryu is a component-based, open source (supported by NTT Labs) framework imple-
mented entirely in Python. The Ryu messaging service does support components developed
in other languages.
Components include an OpenFlow wire protocol support, event management, messag-
ing, in-memory state management, application management, infrastructure services and a
series of reusable libraries. Additionally, applications like Snort, a layer 2 switch, GRE tun-
nel abstractions, VRRP, as well as services (e.g., topology and statistics) are available[12].
At the API layer, Ryu has an Openstack Quantum plug-in that supports both GRE based
overlay and VLAN configurations. Ryu also supports a REST interface to its OpenFlow
operations[4]. A prototype component has been demonstrated that uses HBase for statis-
tics storage, including visualization and analysis via the stats component tools. While Ryu
supports high availability via a Zookeeper component, it does not yet support a cooperative
cluster of controllers.
Floodlight
Floodlight is a very popular SDN controller contribution from Big Switch Networks
to the open source community. Floodlight is based on Beacon from Stanford University.
Floodlight is an Apache-licensed, Java-based OpenFlow controller.
The Floodlight core engineering is secluded, with parts including topology adminis-
tration, device administration, path calculation, foundation for web access, counter store,
and a summed up capacity deliberation for state storage[4]. These parts are dealt with as
loadable administrations with interfaces that export state. The controller itself introduces
an arrangement of extensible REST APIs and additionally an event framework. The API
enables applications to get and set this condition of the controller, and in addition to sub-
scribe to occasions transmitted from the controller utilizing Java Event Listeners.These are
altogether made accessible to the application engineer in the various ways
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The main module called the Floodlight Provider, handles I/O from switches and makes
an interpretation of OpenFlow messages into Floodlight event attributes, along these lines
making an event-driven, nonconcurrent application structure. Floodlight joins a thread-
ing model that enables modules to impart strings to different modules. Event handling
within this structure occurs inside the distributing module’s thread setting. Synchronized
locks ensure shared information. Part conditions are settled at stack time by means of
configuration[4].
There are additionally test applications that incorporate a learning switch, a center
point application, and a static stream push application.
Furthermore, Floodlight offers an OpenStack Quantum module.
The Floodlight OpenFlow controller can interoperate with any component operator
that backings OpenFlow, however Big Switch likewise gives an open source specialist (In-
digo) that has been consolidated into business items. Furthermore, Big Switch has likewise
given Loxi, an open source OpenFlow library generator, with various dialect support to
address the issues of multiversion-support in OpenFlow[4].
As an advancement situation, Floodlight is Java/Jython driven. A rich advancement
device chain of assemble and debugging devices is accessible, including a data streamer
and the previously mentioned static flow pusher.
Because of the way that the design utilizes restlets, any module created in this platform
can uncover additionally REST APIs through an IRestAPI benefit. Big Switch has been
currently taking a shot at a data model assemblage tool that changed over Yang to REST,
as an improvement to the platform for the two API distributing and information sharing.
These improvements can be utilized for an assortment of new capacities missing in the
present controller, including state and configuration management.
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1.2.4 Distributed Denial of Service Attack
The web was arranged with usefulness and not security at the highest point of the
prority rundown and it has been exceptionally compelling in achieving its goals. It offers
its clients with brisk, fundamental and modest correspondence frameworks, upheld with
various larger amount conventions that ensures trustworthy or convenient conveyance of
messages or a level of nature of administration. The web configuration takes after the
conclusion to-end world view: commnicating end has depoly complex functionalities to
accomplish needed administration confirmation, while the direct framework gives absolute
minimum, best exertion administration of fundamentally sending the data from the source
host to the destination. The web is overseen distributedly; no basic assention or arrange-
ment can be authorized among its clients. The web configuration opens a couple of security
issues concerning openings for distribited denial of service attack (DDoS)[3]:
• Internet security is highly interdependent: DDoS assaults are normally propelled
from frameworks that have been traded off. Regardless of how secured the casualty
endpoint might be, it can be influenced by DDoS assaults which depends on the
condition of security in the rest of the web[3].
• Internet resources are limited: Each endpoint(host, network, service, etc) connected
to the internet has a consumable resources that can be used up by too many users.
• The power of many is greater than the power of few: logically speaking, due to the
fact that the resources of each endpoint is limited, a coordinated and simultaneous
activity by some users will be detrimental to the others if the resources used by the
malicious users are more than the resources needed by the users[3].
• Intelligence and resources are not arranged: A end-to-end communication structure
incited to putting away the greater part of the knowledge required for benefit affirma-
tion with end hosts, limiting the measure of preparing in the middle of the network
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organize so packets could be sent quickly and at immaterial cost. In the meantime, a
need for tremendous throughput provoked the arrangement of high information move
limit pathways in the halfway system, while in the end frameworks place assets in
just as much data transfer capacity as they figure they may require. Thusly, vindictive
clients/customers can mishandle the rich assets of the unwitting middle of the road
organize for conveyance of various messages to a less resourced casualty[3].
• Accountability is not enforced: in IP packets the source address is required to convey
the IP address of the machine that created the data. This suspicion isn’t for the most
part approved or upheld anytime on the course from the source to the destination.
This influences the open door for the source to address parodying which is manu-
facturing a source address field in a parket. This instrument gives the aggressors the
ability to sidestep being in charge of their activities and furthermore the approaches
to do their assault, as great case is the SMURF assault[3].
• Control is distributed: The web is in a dispersed way and each system is keep running
as indicated by local policies characterized by its proprietors. The suggestions are
plenty, there is no real way to authorize worldwide sending of a specific security sys-
tem or security strategy and because of protection concerns, it is frequently difficult
to explore diverse network traffic character[3].
Because of all of security concerns related with the internet system this has offered ap-
proach to noxious assaults like DDoS attacks. A DDoS attack is done in a few stages. The
main goal of the assailant is to bargain more endpoints/machines(slaves). This procedure
is generally done through filtering and specifying remote machines for vulnerabilities that
empowers their subversion. These frameworks are then misused utilizing the found vulner-
abilities and are contaminated with the assault code. This stage is robotized and the tainted
machines can be utilized for promote enlistment of new operators.
Operators machines are utilized to send the strike bundles. Aggressors regularly dis-
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guise the personality of subverted machines in the midst of the assault through mocking
of the source address utilized as a part of assault parcels. Regardless, that parodying isn’t
generally required for an effective DDoS assault. Except for reflector assaults, all other
assault utilizes[3].
1.3 Goals
In this thesis, we designed and implemented a system capable of mitigating against
HTTP-GET attacks by using behavioral analysis to identify the malicious traffic in the
network that can be easily mistaken as benign traffic. In a way to solve this task, SDN
architecture and networking was adopted to help solve the problem because of the powerful
features like the ability to dictate to the network how it should run and to get real time
updates about the findings in the network.
This architecture due to some of these features can help detect the malicious traffic by
comparing traffic and looking at some behavioral response of host in the network to some
requests and responses from their various communications and sessions. We deliberately
took up the HTTP-GET attack because it is one of the low-rate attacks which does not
trigger sensors because, the traffic is not just only low-rate, it is also a legitimate request
from a malicious host. This makes it difficult for IDS and other sensors to be able to
mitigate or detect the attack before it is too late.
The scope of this work is to put to test the capabilities of SDN (Software Defined
Networking) with the concept of behavioral analysis in critically looking at the traffic of
the network and conditions that needs to be met by these hosts to be assured as benign hosts
and intermittently verifying the said benign host depending on the set threshold.
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1.4 Organization
Chapter 1 describes the motivation of this work, background on the architecture, goals
of the project and scope of the project. Chapter 2 provides an overview of related work in
this area and approaches taken by the authors. Chapter 3 details the approach used in this
work and the ways employed in detecting the attacks in question. Chapter 4 describes
the implementation of the system, the experiments done based on the discussed system.
Chapter 5 discusses outcome, short-comings and future work on this project. Chapter 6
concludes the thesis.
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Related Work
A number of researchers have done some work on mitigating against DDoS attacks
both high rate and low rate with different mechanisms. S.Lim et al.[5] created a detection
module called DBA (DDoS Blocking Application). This module manages a pool of IP
addresses that can be used for redirection of service. The DBA monitor the number of flows
on each switch and in combination watches out for server metrics to know when there is a
potential attack on the server; when the server determines that there is an attack, the DBA
provides the server with a new IP and new socket for which the service should resume. As
soon as that is done, the DBA provides any client arriving at the former address after the
new address has been allocated with the address as the location for the service, in order
to stop bots from following that new address, the redirect address information is supplied
to the client in a form that imposes high computation barrier for the bots. CAPTCHA
was made use of in the paper and this difficult helps to mitigate the attack and in a further
situation where a bot follows the new address, the DBA changes the address and socket and
it goes on and on. The disadvantage to this technique is the fact that resources are consumed
anytime service has to move and also because there are not a lot of IPs to be allocated, this
also hinders the scalability of the method. Mark Shtern et el. [6] used an anomalous
method of detection where during an attack, there is a detection sensor that detects the
attack and causes the automation controller to provision a Shark Tank which helps to restrict
the area of attack and cause a close surveillance on the malicious redirected traffic. The
performance model uses measured values such as the workload, CPU utilization, CPU time,
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disk utilization, disk time, etc. during a normal traffic as compared with traffic ways above
this baseline. The disadvantage of this method is that there will be more false positives
and if the wrong traffic is used to train the baseline then there will not be any way the
detection can be made. Yang Xu and Yong Liu [7] used two detection mechanism, which
is victim detection and post-detection, the victim detection procedure swiftly detects attack
victim and by considering the flow volume feature and the flow rate asymmetry features,
these were captured by looking at the total flow from an IP to a destination and back, this
helps to focus on the smallest possible ranges of IPs containing potential victims. The post-
detection procedure is more efficient in that it saves some computation consumption; also
in a detecting the attack in this method could either be by passive or active processing, the
passive processing migrates the normal service to a new IP like the first article discussed
above and active processing where there is an active monitoring of the network for the
attacker and installing rules to drop them, which is a method used in this project because it
saves network resources and does not affect the activity of normal users.
Saman Taghavi Zargar et. al [8] discussed the various classification of a DDoS attack
and the various way of detecting an ongoing attack. The author looked at various tools
used and the explanation on how they work in terms of attacks and ways they bypass se-
curity sensors. In their method of defense against application-layer DDoS is the use of
CAPTCHA to differentiate bots from humans but this will cause delay to legitimate users,
also they proposed the use of admission control and congestion control to limit the number
of concurrent clients that are served by the server, this works based on port hiding which
renders the service invisible to unauthorized clients by hiding the port number which the
service is being served. Another method is by using a Trust Management Helmet, which is
by giving priority to protecting the connectivity of good users instead of trying to identify
all the attack requests, which give each user a license that cryptographically secured and a
trust value based on the user’s history. These methods are not effective enough because the
attack traffic could have already affected the victims already.
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Chaitanya Buragohain and Nabajyoti Medhi [9] developed an algorithm that sets the
Layer-7 constraints based on the flow rate and flow duration to define a legitimate traffic
pattern of the specific application service, after this has been observed, a traffic tuple is
prepared based on the minimum and maximum values of the traffic rate and the duration
of data obtained from usage from legitimate users. They also have various categories of
classification of attacks that do not the set thresholds; the Short-Lived High Rate; the Long-
Lived High rate; the Idle User, and Long-Lived Low Rate attacks. The rate was collected
by using a sFlow-RT to get IPs that fall in the threshold or outside the threshold set by
the network administrator. Even though this system seems efficient but the threshold can
mistakenly be set wrong or have an attack traffic used as a threshold for the detection which
will cause the attack system to work incorrectly.
Parneet Kaur et. al [10] wrote a review of detection approaches for distributed denial
of service attacks and discussed various approaches in detecting DDoS attacks which can
include signature-based detection, which captures the required behavior from various data
set and collect facts about various attacks and exposures. It uses a vulnerability pattern or
signature to compare with incoming traffic and drops packets that match the misuse signa-
ture and allow packets that do not match the signature. This detection method is only good
for known attacks and nothing else. Another approach is anomaly-based detection which
can be called the novelty detection has the capacity to detect new attacks. This approach is
trained with the standard network behavior of the network and compares it with the inflow-
ing data. When there is a slight difference between the trained set and the observed thresh-
old, the anomaly system generates and the attack is disclosed. There are sub-categories
for the anomaly detection such as point anomaly which compares a single flow with the
remaining dataset, some of the techniques used for point anomaly are statistical methods,
data mining, artificial intelligence, etc. Another sub-category discussed is the contextual
anomaly-based detection by comparing the abnormal context situation in the traffic flow as
noted with the set contextual anomaly set, because every data is defined by its attributes
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and behavioral attributes.The last sub-category is the collective anomaly-based detection
deals with data instances that relate to each other and the reorganizing of data instances is
unusual to the residual data set. Although a single data instance in a collective anomaly
may or may not be anomalous the collection of such instances appears as anomalous. In
general, an anomalous detection system is known for its high false positive rate.
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Design
A number of challenges presented in the design of this program. Below we detail
these challenges and the solutions which were developed for solving them.
3.1 Problem Formulation
In this work, we propose a system that can identify the bots or compromised hosts
in an SDN network during a HTTP-GET attack. The basis for finding these issues lies in
doing a behavioral analysis of the traffic of the SDN network. Due to the whole view of the
network from the SDN Controllers perspective, and with the ability to write applications to
solve a specific problem, it is possible to analyze the traffic and solve some of the DDoS
attacks that cripple services. Our behavioral analysis involves looking at the traffic and
studying the behavior of each IP as an entity and how they behave towards the target that is
been protected.
3.2 Scope of Problem
Denial of Service attack is one of the attacks used by an attacker to cripple services
and systems, aside from that, there are varieties of DDoS attacks such as volume based,
protocol-based and application layer based attacks. For volume-based attacks, the attacker
wants to quickly consume the bandwidth of the target, although there are methods to stop
these attacks such as, an intrusion detection system or sensors; these systems can detect
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this voluminous traffic such as ICMP floods, UDP floods, etc. Also, for protocol attacks
which includes SYN floods, fragmented packets, Smurf, Ping of Death which can cause
a buffer overflow and exhaust the resources of the targeted server or service. Lastly, the
application layer attack can be very stealthy and difficult to catch which is the focus of
this thesis, some examples are HTTP Flood attacks, Slowloris, etc. They are difficult to
get hold of because the packet and the payload are legitimate, and due to this fact, they
are easily allowed through both stateless and stateful firewalls and other IDS sensors. Also
what makes it very stealthy is the fact that it is a low rate, so it does not trigger any sensor.
3.2.1 HTTP-GET Attack
Given a focus on this very type because it is one of the forms of the low-rate applica-
tion layer DDoS attack. According to a normal web server, there has to be a client and a
server as shown in Figure 3.1, the client does the three-way handshake because the HTTP
is based on a TCP transport protocol, so there has to be an SYN − > ACK, SYN − >
ACK. After the connection has been made, then the client sends an HTTP GET request to
the server and the server replies the client with an HTTP Response which in most time is
an HTML document. The client gets this page and interprets it with a web browser. In
a case of an attack, like the HTTP-GET attack such as the HTTP flood, Slowloris, etc.
the attacker launches multiple connections by sending legitimate packets, each connection
makes an SYN − > ACK, SYN − > ACK, which evades stateful firewall and IDS sensors
because they are legitimate and they are allowed through to the target/web server. Each of
this connection is a route for the attacker to send an HTTP GET request and as usual the
server responds with an HTTP RESPONSE, the tweak to this is that normally after this, the
server is meant to close the session to release resources for the next client but in this case
the attacker discards this response from the attacker and re-sends the request to keep that
the connection on and while those connections are on, it tries to make more connections
as legitimate users release their connection due to finished session with the server. The
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Figure 3.1: Client-to-Server
Figure 3.2: HTTP-GET Attack
diagram as shown in Figure 3.2 shows a victim being targeted by an attacker by using bots
to launch the DDoS(HTTP-GET) attack. Another observation of this kind of attack is that
only the victim feels the heat of the attack and benign users are denied access to the service
rendered by the web server. The packets are benign, they are legitimate GET requests, they
are a low rate, they are not large packets, they do not trigger any sensor and they wreak
havoc, which boils down to the intent of the attacker which is to exhaust the resources of
the server. A good way to know when this attack is in the process is by seeing the network
flow as a whole which makes SDN a good fit to tackle this problem.
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Figure 3.3: Client Resources Request
3.3 Method of Approach
Due to the stealthy characteristics of attack in focus, a good way to approach it is to do
a behavioral analysis of the network, since the SDN Controller seats on top of the network
logically, this will enable the SDN Controller to monitor the behavior of every host in the
network for an anomaly. For the defined problem above, a way to know an anomaly is to
see how a benign user uses the service because that is the valid way to use the service. For
the proper understanding of the approach used to go about the behavioral analysis, we will
go in-depth on how a normal user behaves with a server. As shown in the diagram below
in Figure 3.3 is that, aside from the first response from the server, the server also gives
more information about resources that need to be gotten for the full-fledged display of the
requested page, some of these resources are fonts, images, cascading style sheets (CSS).
As soon as the client gets these, the client sends a request each based on this referee to
these other sites for the resources and everything gets back to complete the request page at
first. An assumption pulled from the above is that attackers want to get the job done in a
quick, economic manner, they try to reduce the cost as much as possible and get as much
success as possible. In that sense, looking at the traffic of a benign user and a malicious user
or a bot, it is very obvious which IP address is doing what and which set of IP addresses
are causing the problem. To even make it interesting, this behavior can help study these
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malicious IPs further by rerouting their traffic to a separate network for further study.
3.4 Attack Detection
Due to the stealthy nature of this kind of low rate attacks, there has to be a way to
identify them, during a normal network operation, the controller makes sure for a good
network operation, which means that it also makes sure the target gets the whole attack
towards it because at first, it does not know what traffic is malicious. In order to cause
the controller to have a proper look at the traffic, the target has to in one way or the other
report the attack to the controller so that the controller can investigate more into the network
traffic. The server has a reporting module that sends a report to the server about a possible
attack.
3.4.1 Signature Generation
In order to create a baseline of what is called a normal behavior, we need to create a
signature that will help know when a user goes out of line. As described above, when a
page is requested, there are other resources gotten to make the web page display as designed
such as CSS, images, javascript files, etc.The web server generates a signature of a list of
domains/IPs that has to be visited for a complete display of the web page it is hosting and
have that kept as the signature for further use in the face of an attack. As seen in Figure
3.4, the first step is the web server relays to the detection module about the consumption
of its resources, the detection module creates a message which contains the list of the IP
addresses of the resources a normal client is supposed to visit and send it to the controller.
These signatures are key and they help to differentiate the supposed benign user from a
malicious user/bot. So for a domain xyz.com; there will be a tuple of (ip1, ip2, ip3,....,
ipN).
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Figure 3.4: Steps to Detection
3.4.2 Flow Table Dynamics
Based on the Figure 3.4, in step 3 the detector application installed on the controller
gets the signature from the controller and create a flow rule based on the IP addresses gotten
via the controller, which is also shown in the Figure 3.6 as the table changes from the flow
table shown in Figure 3.5. As shown in Figure 3.5, the flow table switch packets in a simple
form based on the flow rules installed on it. In the case of an attack, in the step 4 of Figure
3.4, the controller instructs all the forwarding devices it controls to erase all the rules in the
flow rule table that is attributed to the server. As soon as that is done, the controller installs
a flow for each client requesting for a page from the server. For any flow that expires from
the forwarding devices that was written by the controller due to the attack, signature of IP
addresses are sent to the controller for further analysis by the controller, this analysis is
to check if this client/IP behaved like a benign user based on if the client contacted the IP
addresses of the resources and if not the client is classified as a bot/malicious device. This
can be seen in Figure 3.7 as some client have a drop action against and some have normal
against them. The ones with the drop action are the malicious devices while the ones with
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Figure 3.5: Normal Operation Scenario Flow Table
Figure 3.6: During Attack Flow Table Glance
the action normal against them are the benign ones.
3.4.3 Monitoring Traffic for Anomaly
The SDN Controller always monitors the network based on what applications are
installed on this controller, it could be a load balancer, routing module, etc. The mitigate
module developed for this project looks out for traffic based on the flows written by this
module and as described above about the dynamics of the flow table during this detection
and mitigation, the controller gets responses from the data plane about the flows that were
removed that the module is interested in and signatures that were visited by clients in the
network and also the statistics thereof. By monitoring the traffic under the attack detection
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Figure 3.7: After Detection Flow Table Glance
mode, the controller can see the behavior of each host clearly. This monitoring is done with
some of the features of SDN like PACKET INs, Flow removed data and also statistics from
the switch. The method of monitoring used in this project is the active monitoring because
since each host going to the server is recorded in the flow table, so for every host that
matches any of those rules on the flow table, the host is reported to the controller of its
activity in the network such as bytes exchanged, packet counts, domains visited in step 5
in Fig 3.4. This details can help accurately identify a benign user from a malicious user.
3.5 Mitigation
After the detection of the attack and analysis has been done, we can start the mitigation
of the detected attack based on the analysis and information at hand. Based on observation
from the traffic of most low rate connection is the persistent connection that they possess,
with that in mind, we starting looking at the tuples of hosts; any host that has the set of
signatures which was sent by the detection module will be considered as a benign host and
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any host outside of this range of signatures will be considered malicious because based
on the total bytes exchanged from that host, all went to the server. For the benign user;
they cannot be trusted fully because of false negatives. So for each permission given to the
legitimate user, there is a timeout for that flow that makes it mandatory to re-authenticate
after that flow expires from the flow table. While for a user that is suspected of malicious
is blocked from its data to be sent to the server by writing a drop action to its flow. As said
earlier, due to the initial connection made to the server, the controller steps in to reset this
connection by sending each malicious link a reset connection packet (RST). The controller
is capable of doing that because it can generate packets to with the various values for
the fields such as the IP, port number, seq no, etc, based on this the controller resets all
the malicious connected and the benign user is not affected by the attack as it is silently
handled.
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Implementation
The goal of this project was to mitigate against low rate attack with more emphasis on
HTTP-GET attack using SDN by doing a behavioral analysis on the traffic. In our work,
we used active processing in the behavioral analysis by looking into each host compro-
mised under the SDN network and also effectively stopping the attack without causing any
disruption for benign users using the targeted service.
4.1 Emulated Environment
Table 4.1 summarizes the software and hardware used in the emulations. We created
a real-time network by using the OpenvSwitch on the main host system, the host system
was configured to route its packet through the interface/port created by the OpenvSwitch.
After creating the OpenvSwitch, the virtual box was used to created multiple virtual ma-
chines(VMs), the VMs were given 2GB each for their operation, some of the VMs had
Kali Linux operating system while the others have Ubuntu operating system. Each of this
VMs has its own port on the switch which connects these VMs to the switch virtually. The
controller communicated with the switch by using the dedicated communication channel
between a switch and a controller. The implementation and experimentation were done on
an Ubuntu OS Linux Distro.
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Table 4.1: Summary of emulation setup
Tools Details
Switch Software OpenvSwitch 2.3.1
Controller Floodlight 1.2
Southbound Protocol OpenFlow version 1.0
Hosts 12 hosts which includes Benign hosts us-
ing Ubuntu Linux Distro and Malicious
hosts using Kali Linux Distro
Server Apache Server
4.2 Emulation Details
For the HTTP-GET attack discussed in chapter 3, we conducted a separate test to
observe the effect of the attack and the various ways it can be used, we also looked at the
traffic of a normal network traffic by browsing sites normally and observing the network
by using Wireshark to observe the traffic, after observing the behavior of these two cases
we came up with a normal and an attack situations. In the normal traffic, for each user the
bytes exchange is distinct and the server operates normally without any service affected
while on the other hand, the traffic was also distinct but the size of bytes exchanged differ
from comparisons of various attack tools, some exchange is very low and while some are
large but while been sent are low but when reassembled they are high on the server side.
4.2.1 Detection Details
As discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the way it was implemented is that we have a de-
tection module programmed on the server with the resolved IPs of the page the server is
hosting. The module also listens and monitors the process of the server running on the
system. It also keeps track of the number of processes the application creates, each of this
thread represents the connections initiated with the server it is monitoring. Also as said
earlier that in an attack like a low-rate, it is always the target that knows it is been targeted
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that is why we moved the detection module to the target, in this case, the server. Due to the
memory of the system, there is a portion of memory that is allocated to the server applica-
tion and when the allocated memory is used up the server cannot create a new thread and
cannot take in more connections. So based on the system in use we set a threshold based on
the observation made on the number of threads it can create. This set threshold is a signal
for the application to send the signature to the controller. The protocol used in sending the
signature is UDP and not TCP because we want the controller to get it very fast and even
though it might seem unreliable using UDP, it works because it sends it immediately the
threshold is crossed.
4.2.2 Signature Retrieval
The signature is an integral part of the mechanism which helps the controller to ef-
fectively analyze the network and observe the behavior of each host in the network. The
signature is a list of IP addresses that benign user will probe if it was to get the page nor-
mally. These IP addresses were put in a packet and sent to the controller by the detection
module. The IP addresses were used because, we know that at least a benign client will
probe these IP addresses. In other to be able to swiftly act to the detected attack by the
detection module, the controller sets up an IPx as the destination and the source as the
server, so this rule is installed on the switch, the rule basically tells the switch to send any
packet that matches the rule of a packet from the server to the IPx the controller picked. As
soon as the detection module sends these signatures to the IPx, the switch encapsulates the
whole packet in a PACKET IN and sends it to the controller. The controller takes up this
packet and does a deep packet extraction to get the payload of the packet which contains
the signature sent by the detection module. The controller then puts all the signature in a
list for further use.
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Listing 4.1: Rule to Retrieve the Signature
1 If assessment is set to False
2 Check to make sure the packet is UDP and the destination is ...
the controller
3 Get the Signature of IPs and store it
4
5 If the list is not empty
6 Output to the console that the list has content
7 If not, output to the console that the list is still empty
4.2.3 Building the profile
The signature gotten by the detection module that is sent to the controller is used to
build a profile for each host that visits the server, at this point a flow rule has already been to
the switch that leads each host to the server, this particular flow rule has a short hard timeout
which is enough time to get to the server for a request. While that is on, a rule is also written
for each signature gotten, so that when any host match this rule, we can pull the IP address
of the host and build a profile for that host, so for each host IP i = [IPsi, IPsii, ...IPni] to
correlate this; in the OpenFlow protocol there is an FLOW REMOVED response anytime
a flow is removed from the switch informing the controller of the removed flow, so in this
project we registered our module to look out for this flow removed for evaluation of that
host’s activity so far based on the signature trail it made.
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Listing 4.2: Profile SetUp
1 For each profile of a host in the set of profiles
2 Initialize the variable for the signature count
3 If the host is one of the stored clients
4
5 If the set of probed signature IPs is greater than or
6 equal to 1
7 Add the IP Address to the list of benign hosts
8
9 If the report IP address is in the benign list
10 Install a rule to allow the IP a longer time
11 Else
12 Deny the host for a longer time
4.2.4 Filtering
This process involves separating the bots/malicious users from the ”benign” users.
After building the profile as stated above, we filter out both parties according to the trails
of each host, if a host trail count is less than the accepted threshold then the host will be
blacklisted, in order to reduce the false positives we set a threshold that helps to adjust that.
The profiling above helps to build the count, so at the expiration of the flow for a host to
a server we use the reported IP to get the IP with its count and if it meets the threshold or
higher then it is counted as a ”benign” host while if the count is less then it is counted a
malicious host. After this analysis have been done we move further to stop the attack since
we have been able to figure out the distinction and the malicious ones. For the ”benign” host
we write a new flow that gives them more time to do their business with the server while
for the blacklisted malicious hosts, we wrote a rule to drop further packets going from the
malicious host and in addition to this we sent a reset to initial malicious connections to the
server, on behalf of the server to disconnect the connection between the malicious host and
the server.
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Listing 4.3: Data Structure for a Rule for Each Host
1 If the assessment is True and IP Address has not been assessed
2 before
3 If protocol is TCP and the destination of the packet is
4 the server
5 Get the payload of the IPv4 packet payload
6 Get the source port of the TCP
7 Get the destination port of the TCP
8 If the port is 80
9 Install an individual flow rule for the client
10 If the IP address is not in the list of IP address
11 that has visited the server
12 Add the IP address to the list
4.2.5 Assurance Measures
In a situation where a malicious user is mistaken for a benign user, we catered for
that with an assurance measure. This is done in the process after the benign user has been
identified. For every benign user, a longer timeout is given, as soon as the time is up, we
remove the IP address from the list of benign users. If the user wants to access the server,
even though it was previously tagged benign, it has to reassure that controller that it is still
a benign user, based on its behavior. This mechanism is put in place in order not to trust a
client and also to increase the cost of the attacker.
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Evaluation
This thesis work was evaluated using real attack tools to test the effectiveness of the
approach we took. Also, we were able to see what kind of attack traffic each tool considered
outputs and other experimental results.
5.1 Attack Tools
In a way to test the proposed methodology, as discussed in the implementation section,
we set up the testbed which is close to real life traffic and used attack tools to test the system.
Some of the tools that we used to perform the attack are:
5.1.1 Slowloris
Slowloris is a tool that affects the targeted HTTP service without affecting other ser-
vice running on the server. These tools bring down a server by exhausting the connections
on the server. It works by making incomplete HTTP connections to the targeted server, it
tries to keep an HTTP session alive continuously for a long time. This tool brings down
web servers like Apache because of its threaded model[14]. Apache server was used in the
evaluation of the methodology to see if this saves the server from failing.
45
5.1.2 HTTPLoris
HTTPLoris is one of the tools that is packaged under the PyLoris attack toolset, the
HTTPLoris is a low rate DoS attack, it uses the slow loris method by creating large num-
ber of full TCP connections and keep them alive, then send partial HTTP request to the
server, when the service hit the limited, the service is denied to benign users, it works on
exhausting the resources of the server.[14]
5.1.3 SlowHTTPTest
This tool relies on the HTTP protocol design which requires a request to be wholly
received by the targeted server before it is processed, in any case where the request is not
complete or the rate of transfer is low, the server keeps the resources busy waiting for the
rest of the data, when server’s pool resources reaches maximum, this creates a denial of
service. This tool is a variant of the slow loris which opens and maintains a custom slow
connections to a server. [13]
5.2 Testing
These tools are used to cause a denial of service to servers. Based on one of the
observation of the testing of these tools that were used in testing the methodology, we
found out that it is quite impossible to know when the attack is on because of the traffic
rate of each host. Also, the size of an HTTP request packet is not large, the window size is
also reduced which causes the packet to take its time before the whole request gets to the
server. On an average the total rates for a sample rogue client as shown in Figure 5.1 is 43.4
kbits/sec and 32.4 packets/sec; the incoming rate is 42.0 kbits/sec with 30.0 packets/sec;
the outgoing rate is 1.4 kbits/sec with 2.4 packets/sec. The stated statistics showed that
the attack traffic is very low that it does not seem harmful to network sensors. That is how
difficult it is to detect the attack from the traffic sampling. Furthermore, because these tools
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Figure 5.1: Summary of the attack traffic
are different, they have different sizes of data sent as shown in the traffic analysis used on
the server called IPTraf in Figure 5.3, it showed that 93.3% of the sample traffic is between
1-75 bytes/sec; 0.12% of the traffic is between 76-150 bytes; 6.26% of the traffic is between
226-300 bytes; and 0.3% of the traffic is between 526-600 bytes, and the randomization of
the number of packets sent over the network, this is done by using the unused ports from
the bot and randomizing the number of packets that will be sent to each port as shown in
Figure 5.2. In a case where there are multiple ports, there are few requests sent through
each port; this act also helps to confuse the security sensors such as IDS and IPS which
renders those sensors useless. Most of these tools are variants of slow loris, so even though
the network traffic seems random, it still has the same intent, which is what was targeted
by this method.
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Figure 5.2: Connections to the server from a malicious host
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Figure 5.3: Packet Size Breakdown
5.3 Methodology Effectiveness
As shown in the Figures 5.4 - 5.6, it shows the effectiveness of the methodology, as we
tested the architecture with 200 connections/second to 500 connections/second, as shown,
the controller was able to respond to dropping the attack before 19 seconds which is faster
than authors that used the passive method of detection, also after dropping packets from
the attack, it was able to reset all the connections that were made to the server by sending
a reset response to the attacker/bot through the port the bots contacted the server with.
Another observation is that due to the capacity of the system that is being used which is a
4GB RAM VM for the controller, it was taking more time to reset all the connection as the
number of connections increases, but for certain the server gets restored quickly, but this
is a trivial issue because instead of dropping and trying to reset the connections, we can
redirect the traffic for further observation.
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Figure 5.4: Effect of the Methodology on the Attack
Figure 5.5: Effect of the Methodology on the Attack
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Figure 5.6: Effect of the Methodology on the Attack
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Discussion
We believe the methodology used has been shown to be effective after testing it with
real-life scenario tools as stated in the evaluation section. As mentioned before that based
on the assumption that attackers like to direct their attack to a specific target without want-
ing to consider any other channels that might want to distract their attack, so in this project
as much as we stopped the attack, we also increased the cost of an attack on the attacker’s
side. Software-defined networking architecture showed that it has so many things to offer,
not just in the network security section but in how traffic is being managed, as seen, this
can be handled efficiently with the module being programmed on the controller. In the
previous section we showed the results of how the controller swung into action as soon as
it got the signature from the attack module which gives a good indication of how logically
centralized the controller is and with the ability to observe the whole network to not just
coordinate the traffic but to apply all the appropriate modules as instructed by the adminis-
trator of the network. Also as shown, we can also see that for each tool, there are different
traffic pattern but almost similar to the same class of tool. The traffic pattern shows that it
will be difficult to actually stop all of the DDoS attacks without a sense of the behavior of
each host in the network. Also, this project also sheds more light on the way behavioral
analysis can be used to study the traffic of attacks like low rate DDoS attacks to help curb
or mitigate against it. The way the behavioral analysis is done is based on the signature of
the hosts in the network, where the controller had the feature to track all the hosts in its net-
work and observes their traffic based on the benign pattern that was configured. The project
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as discussed earlier focused more on HHTP-GET attack only and not on other low-rate at-
tacks, although this is not a hassle, the core thing is to observe how other low-rate DDoS
attacks, such as HTTP-POST, etc. works and use that as a definition for the baseline in the
code as the behavior of the HTTP-GET was observed; which produces the signature to look
out for in the traffic during an attack, also the rule will change a bit because we might want
to really consider the bytes exchanged in a case like HTTP-POST. The attack module was
very effective in monitoring the thread that was created by the Apache server, also because
the threshold varies from system, there might be need to make the attack module flexible
when considering the trigger threshold.
Based on how the signature is set up, if the attacker can craft a packet to get request
from one the signature servers, it will be assumed as the benign user, but to mitigate against
that, we used a timeout to help set a particular time given to an assumed benign user, after
the timeout, the IP address is deleted from the list of IP address taken as benign and every
host has to show that it is benign to be re-added to the list of benign IP addresses. This
shows that there is no explicit trust shown to any host in the network during this attack
phase.
Furthermore, the flow-table is limited because the TCAM of each switch is limited, so
even though we used the active processing technique to detect the attack, we were able to
manage the flow table properly. Also in comparison with other methods of detection, our
methodology showed its effectiveness and also its quicker response as compared to related
works, without having to move services to another port or IP Address. The features of SDN
gave us the power to not depend on numbers such as the flow rate or the packet size which
can change but to actually use the intention of the packet flow in the network through
the supposed behavior of a benign host in a time frame. Overall this project proofs that
mitigating against low-rate attacks is very difficult but with new networking architectures
like SDN, there is hope in mitigating against them.
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Conclusion
This thesis has described a prototype system for performing mitigation against low
rate DDoS attack in particular HTTP-GET attack. We demonstrated the use of the pro-
totype with attack tools and the results supported the theory behind the prototype. Also,
we also talked about the challenges faced and how they were overcome, and also with the
specification made on one of the types of low-rate DDoS to show that the use of behavioral
analysis and active processing can help mitigate against low-rate DDoS attack. A num-
ber of tasks for future work include adding other low-rate attack vectors, creating more
complex signatures that stand unique for each protected system, more flexible flow table
management in order to help the limited flow table from getting exhausted. By doing this it
will cause the project to more viable to low-rate DDoS attacks, and cover all the necessary
low-rate attacks.
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Appendix A
Program Code
Listing A.1: Program Code
1 package net.floodlightcontroller.mactracker_2;
2
3 import java.util.ArrayList;
4 import java.util.Collection;
5 import java.util.Collections;
6 import java.util.HashMap;
7 import java.util.HashSet;
8 import java.util.List;
9 import java.util.Map;
10 import java.util.Set;
11 import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentSkipListSet;
12 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.OFFactory;
13 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.OFFlowDeleteStrict;
14 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.OFFlowMod;
15 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.OFFlowModFlags;
16 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.OFFlowRemoved;
17 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.OFMessage;
18 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.OFPacketOut;
19 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.OFType;
20 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.action.OFAction;
21 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.action.OFActionOutput;
22 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.action.OFActions;
23 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.match.Match;
24 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.protocol.match.MatchField;
25 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.types.EthType;
26 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.types.IPv4Address;
27 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.types.IPv4AddressWithMask;
28 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.types.IpProtocol;
29 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.types.MacAddress;
30 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.types.OFBufferId;
31 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.types.OFPort;
32 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.types.TransportPort;
33 import org.projectfloodlight.openflow.types.U64;
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34 import org.slf4j.Logger;
35 import org.slf4j.LoggerFactory;
36
37 import net.floodlightcontroller.core.FloodlightContext;
38 import net.floodlightcontroller.core.IFloodlightProviderService;
39 import net.floodlightcontroller.core.IOFMessageListener;
40 import net.floodlightcontroller.core.IOFSwitch;
41 import net.floodlightcontroller.core.module.FloodlightModuleContext;
42 import ...
net.floodlightcontroller.core.module.FloodlightModuleException;
43 import net.floodlightcontroller.core.module.IFloodlightModule;
44 import net.floodlightcontroller.core.module.IFloodlightService;
45 import net.floodlightcontroller.mactracker.DeviceTracker;
46 import net.floodlightcontroller.packet.Ethernet;
47 import net.floodlightcontroller.packet.IPacket;
48 import net.floodlightcontroller.packet.IPv4;
49 import net.floodlightcontroller.packet.TCP;
50 import net.floodlightcontroller.packet.UDP;
51 import net.floodlightcontroller.util.FlowModUtils;
52
53 public class MACTracker implements IOFMessageListener, ...
IFloodlightModule {
54
55 protected IFloodlightProviderService floodlightProvider;// ...
registering this with the FloodlightProvider
56 protected DeviceTracker deviceListener;
57 protected Set<Long> macAddresses; // Store MacAddress that we ...
have seen.
58 protected static Logger logger; // Logger to output what we saw.
59 private IPv4Address server = IPv4Address.of("192.168.1.3"); ...
// The IP address of the server
60 private final static IPv4Address controllerIp = ...
IPv4Address.of("108.168.10.15"); // The IP address of the ...
controller
61 private static List<String> signat_rs;
62 private static List<IPv4Address> benign = new ...
ArrayList<IPv4Address>();
63 private static List<IPv4Address> filter = new ...
ArrayList<IPv4Address>();
64 private static List<IPv4Address> visited_server = new ...
ArrayList<IPv4Address>();
65 private static Map<IPv4Address, List<IPv4Address>> profile= ...
new HashMap<IPv4Address, List<IPv4Address>>();
66 private boolean monitor = false;
67 int runonce = 0;
68 IPv4Address sign = null;
69 OFFlowMod toServerFlow;
70 Match matchOb;
71 Match benignMatch;
72 IPv4Address reportedIpSrc;
73 IPv4Address reportedIpDst;
74
75
76 @Override
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77 public String getName() {
78 return "MAC-TRACKER";
79 }
80
81 @Override
82 public boolean isCallbackOrderingPrereq(OFType type, String ...
name) {
83 // TODO Auto-generated method stub
84 return false;
85 }
86
87 @Override
88 public boolean isCallbackOrderingPostreq(OFType type, String ...
name) {
89 // TODO Auto-generated method stub
90 return (type.equals(OFType.PACKET_IN) && ...
name.equals("forwarding"));
91 //return false;
92 }
93
94
95 @Override
96 public Collection<Class<? extends IFloodlightService>> ...
getModuleServices() {
97 return null;
98
99 }
100
101 @Override
102 public Map<Class<? extends IFloodlightService>, ...
IFloodlightService> getServiceImpls() {
103 // TODO Auto-generated method stub
104 return null;
105 }
106
107 //Wiring up the module loading system, telling the module ...
loader we depend on it.
108 @Override
109 public Collection<Class<? extends IFloodlightService>> ...
getModuleDependencies() {
110 Collection<Class<? extends IFloodlightService>> l = new ...
ArrayList<Class<? extends IFloodlightService>>();
111 l.add(IFloodlightProviderService.class);
112 return l;
113 }
114
115 //The init() function is used to initialize the data ...
structures and load dependencies
116 @Override
117 public void init(FloodlightModuleContext context) throws ...
FloodlightModuleException {
118 floodlightProvider = ...
context.getServiceImpl(IFloodlightProviderService.class);
119 macAddresses = new ConcurrentSkipListSet<Long>();
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120 logger = LoggerFactory.getLogger(MACTracker.class);
121
122 }
123
124 @Override
125 public void startUp(FloodlightModuleContext context) throws ...
FloodlightModuleException {
126 floodlightProvider.addOFMessageListener(OFType.PACKET_IN, ...
this);
127 floodlightProvider.addOFMessageListener(OFType.FLOW_REMOVED, ...
this);
128
129 }
130
131 /*private void sendBarrier(IOFSwitch sw)
132 {
133 OFBarrierRequest barrierRequest = ...
sw.getOFFactory().buildBarrierRequest().build();
134 ListenableFuture<OFBarrierReply> future = ...
sw.writeRequest(barrierRequest);
135 try
136 {
137 future.get(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
138 }catch(InterruptedException | ExecutionException | ...
TimeoutException e)
139 {
140 logger.error("Switch {} doesn't support barrier ...
messages? OVS should", sw.toString());
141 }
142 }*/
143
144 public void insertFlows(IOFSwitch sw, IPv4Address Ip)
145 {
146
147 OFFactory swFactory = sw.getOFFactory();
148 OFActions actions = swFactory.actions();
149
150 /*
151 * ...
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
152 * The flow that allows the server ...
monitoring application to get to the controller in ...
the case of an attack.
153 * ...
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
154 */
155
156
157 /*
158 * Server Alert is to be caught by a pro-active flow ...
written ahead of time.*/
159 ArrayList<OFAction> action_list = new ArrayList<OFAction>();
160 OFActionOutput post_alert = actions.buildOutput() // ...
action output for alert from server
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161 .setMaxLen(0xFFffFFff)
162 .setPort(OFPort.CONTROLLER)
163 .build();
164 action_list.add(post_alert);
165
166
167 Match alertServer = swFactory.buildMatch() // matching ...
fields of the packet to be acted on for the alert packet
168 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE, EthType.IPv4)
169 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, server)
170 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, controllerIp)
171 .setExact(MatchField.IP_PROTO, IpProtocol.UDP)
172 .setExact(MatchField.UDP_SRC, ...
TransportPort.of(79))
173 .build();
174
175 OFFlowMod flowAddAlert = swFactory.buildFlowAdd() // ...
setting the parameter of the flow to be added
176 .setBufferId(OFBufferId.NO_BUFFER)
177 .setCookie(U64.of(0))
178 .setPriority(32769)
179 .setHardTimeout(100)
180 .setIdleTimeout(100)
181 .setActions(action_list)
182 .setMatch(alertServer)
183 .build();
184
185
186
187 sw.write(flowAddAlert); // added the flow to every switch ...
in the network
188 logger.info("Alert rule installed"); // A verbose that ...
the alert has been installed
189 /*
190 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
191 * END OF THE FLOW INSERTION ...
FROM THE SERVER TO THE CONTROLLER
192 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
193 */
194
195
196 /*
197 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
198 * FLOW INSERTION FROM ...
ANYONE TO THE SERVER
199 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
200 */
201
202
203
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204 /*
205 * Server destined packet is pre-installed ahead of time.*/
206 ArrayList<OFAction> action_any = new ArrayList<OFAction>();
207 OFActionOutput actToServer = actions.buildOutput() // ...
action output for alert from server
208 .setMaxLen(0xFFffFFff)
209 .setPort(OFPort.NORMAL)
210 .build();
211 action_any.add(actToServer);
212
213
214 Match flowServerIn = swFactory.buildMatch() // matching ...
fields of the packet to be acted on for the alert packet
215 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE, EthType.IPv4)
216 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, server)
217 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, Ip)
218 .setExact(MatchField.IP_PROTO, IpProtocol.TCP)
219 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_DST, ...
TransportPort.of(80))
220 .build();
221
222 toServerFlow = swFactory.buildFlowAdd() // setting the ...
parameter of the flow to be added
223 .setBufferId(OFBufferId.NO_BUFFER)
224 .setCookie(U64.of(0))
225 .setPriority(32769)
226 .setHardTimeout(2)
227 .setIdleTimeout(2)
228 .setActions(action_any)
229 .setMatch(flowServerIn)
230 .build();
231
232
233
234 sw.write(toServerFlow); // added the flow to every switch ...
in the network
235 logger.info("Server flowrule installed"); // A verbose ...
that the alert has been installed
236
237 /*
238 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
239 * END OF INSTALL FLOW FROM ...
ANYONE TO THE SERVER
240 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
241 */
242
243
244
245 /*
246 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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247 * THIS SECTION INSTALL THE FLOW THAT ...
WILL REMAIN, WHICH IS THE REPLY FROM THE SERVER TO ...
ANY DESTINATION
248 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
249 */
250 ArrayList<OFAction> action_server = new ...
ArrayList<OFAction>();
251 OFActionOutput server_flow = actions.buildOutput() // ...
action output for alert from server
252 .setMaxLen(0xFFffFFff)
253 .setPort(OFPort.NORMAL)
254 .build();
255 action_server.add(server_flow);
256
257
258 Match srcServer = swFactory.buildMatch() // matching ...
fields of the packet to be acted on for the alert packet
259 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE, EthType.IPv4)
260 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, server)
261 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, Ip)
262 .setExact(MatchField.IP_PROTO, IpProtocol.TCP)
263 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_SRC, ...
TransportPort.of(80))
264 .build();
265
266 OFFlowMod flowAddServerN = swFactory.buildFlowAdd() // ...
setting the parameter of the flow to be added
267 .setBufferId(OFBufferId.NO_BUFFER)
268 .setCookie(U64.of(0))
269 .setPriority(32769)
270 .setHardTimeout(2)
271 .setIdleTimeout(2)
272 .setActions(action_server)
273 .setMatch(srcServer)
274 .build();
275
276 sw.write(flowAddServerN);
277 logger.info("Server reply rule installed");
278
279 /*
280 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
281 * END OF THE INJECTION OF ...
THE FLOW FOR THE SERVER TO ANY DESTINATION
282 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
283 */
284
285 }
286
287
288
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289 public void insertFlowD(IOFSwitch sw, IPv4Address Ip, ...
MacAddress srcMAC, MacAddress dstMAC)
290 {
291
292 OFFactory swFactory = sw.getOFFactory();
293 OFActions actions = swFactory.actions();
294
295
296 /*
297 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
298 * FLOW INSERTION FROM ...
ANYONE TO THE SERVER
299 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
300 */
301
302
303
304 /*
305 * Server destined packet is pre-installed ahead of time.*/
306 ArrayList<OFAction> action_any = new ArrayList<OFAction>();
307 OFActionOutput actToServer = actions.buildOutput() // ...
action output for alert from server
308 .setMaxLen(0xFFffFFff)
309 .setPort(OFPort.NORMAL)
310 .build();
311 action_any.add(actToServer);
312
313
314 Match MatchOb = swFactory.buildMatch() // matching fields ...
of the packet to be acted on for the alert packet
315 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE, EthType.IPv4)
316 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_SRC, srcMAC)
317 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_DST, dstMAC)
318 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, server)
319 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, Ip)
320 .setExact(MatchField.IP_PROTO, IpProtocol.TCP)
321 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_DST, ...
TransportPort.of(80))
322 .build();
323
324 OFFlowMod ServerFlow = swFactory.buildFlowAdd() // ...
setting the parameter of the flow to be added
325 .setBufferId(OFBufferId.NO_BUFFER)
326 .setCookie(U64.of(0))
327 .setPriority(32770)
328 .setHardTimeout(2)
329 .setIdleTimeout(2)
330 .setActions(action_any)
331 .setMatch(MatchOb)
332 .build();
333
334
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335
336 sw.write(ServerFlow); // added the flow to every switch ...
in the network
337 logger.info("Benign flowrule installed"); // A verbose ...
that the alert has been installed
338
339 /*
340 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
341 * END OF INSTALL FLOW FROM ...
ANYONE TO THE SERVER
342 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
343 */
344
345
346
347 /*
348 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
349 * THIS SECTION INSTALL THE FLOW THAT ...
WILL REMAIN, WHICH IS THE REPLY FROM THE SERVER TO ...
ANY DESTINATION
350 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
351 */
352 ArrayList<OFAction> action_server = new ...
ArrayList<OFAction>();
353 OFActionOutput server_flow = actions.buildOutput() // ...
action output for alert from server
354 .setMaxLen(0xFFffFFff)
355 .setPort(OFPort.NORMAL)
356 .build();
357 action_server.add(server_flow);
358
359
360 Match srcServer = swFactory.buildMatch() // matching ...
fields of the packet to be acted on for the alert packet
361 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE, EthType.IPv4)
362 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_SRC, srcMAC)
363 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_DST, dstMAC)
364 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, Ip)
365 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, server)
366 .setExact(MatchField.IP_PROTO, IpProtocol.TCP)
367 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_SRC, ...
TransportPort.of(80))
368 .build();
369
370 OFFlowMod flowAddServerN = swFactory.buildFlowAdd() // ...
setting the parameter of the flow to be added
371 .setBufferId(OFBufferId.NO_BUFFER)
372 .setCookie(U64.of(0))
373 .setPriority(32770)
374 .setHardTimeout(2)
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375 .setIdleTimeout(2)
376 .setActions(action_server)
377 .setMatch(srcServer)
378 .build();
379
380 sw.write(flowAddServerN);
381 logger.info("Server reply rule installed");
382
383 /*
384 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
385 * END OF THE INJECTION OF ...
THE FLOW FOR THE SERVER TO ANY DESTINATION
386 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
387 */
388
389
390 }
391
392 public void insertFlowE(IOFSwitch sw, IPv4Address Ip, ...
MacAddress src, MacAddress dst, TransportPort portSD)
393 {
394
395 OFFactory swFactory = sw.getOFFactory();
396 OFActions actions = swFactory.actions();
397 Set<OFFlowModFlags> flags = new HashSet<>();
398 flags.add(OFFlowModFlags.SEND_FLOW_REM);
399
400
401 /*
402 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
403 * FLOW INSERTION FROM ...
ANYONE TO THE SERVER
404 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
405 */
406
407
408
409 /*
410 * Server destined packet is pre-installed ahead of time.*/
411 ArrayList<OFAction> action_any = new ArrayList<OFAction>();
412 OFActionOutput actToServer = actions.buildOutput() // ...
action output for alert from server
413 .setMaxLen(0xFFffFFff)
414 .setPort(OFPort.NORMAL)
415 .build();
416 action_any.add(actToServer);
417
418
419 matchOb = swFactory.buildMatch() // matching fields of ...
the packet to be acted on for the alert packet
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420 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE, EthType.IPv4)
421 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_SRC, src)
422 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_DST, dst)
423 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, Ip)
424 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, server)
425 .setExact(MatchField.IP_PROTO, IpProtocol.TCP)
426 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_DST, ...
TransportPort.of(80))
427 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_SRC, portSD)
428 .build();
429
430 OFFlowMod.Builder flowModBuilder = swFactory.buildFlowAdd()
431 .setActions(action_any)
432 .setHardTimeout(3)
433 .setFlags(flags)
434 .setMatch(matchOb)
435 .setPriority(32769);
436
437 /* OFFlowAdd toServFlow = swFactory.buildFlowAdd() // ...
setting the parameter of the flow to be added
438 .setBufferId(OFBufferId.NO_BUFFER)
439 .setCookie(U64.of(0))
440 .setPriority(32770)
441 .setHardTimeout(10)
442 .setActions(action_any)
443 .setMatch(matchOb)
444 .build();*/
445
446
447 sw.write(flowModBuilder.build());
448 //sw.write(toServFlow); // added the flow to every switch ...
in the network
449 logger.info("Server flow for MONITOR MODE"); // A verbose ...
that the alert has been installed
450
451 /*
452 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
453 * END OF INSTALL FLOW FROM ...
ANYONE TO THE SERVER
454 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
455 */
456
457
458
459 /*
460 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
461 * THIS SECTION INSTALL THE FLOW THAT ...
WILL REMAIN, WHICH IS THE REPLY FROM THE SERVER TO ...
ANY DESTINATION
462 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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463 */
464 ArrayList<OFAction> action_server = new ...
ArrayList<OFAction>();
465 OFActionOutput server_flow = actions.buildOutput() // ...
action output for alert from server
466 .setMaxLen(0xFFffFFff)
467 .setPort(OFPort.NORMAL)
468 .build();
469 action_server.add(server_flow);
470
471
472 Match srcServer = swFactory.buildMatch() // matching ...
fields of the packet to be acted on for the alert packet
473 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE, EthType.IPv4)
474 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_SRC, src)
475 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_DST, dst)
476 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, server)
477 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, Ip)
478 .setExact(MatchField.IP_PROTO, IpProtocol.TCP)
479 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_SRC, ...
TransportPort.of(80))
480 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_DST, portSD)
481 .build();
482
483 OFFlowMod flowAddServerN = swFactory.buildFlowAdd() // ...
setting the parameter of the flow to be added
484 .setBufferId(OFBufferId.NO_BUFFER)
485 .setCookie(U64.of(0))
486 .setPriority(32770)
487 .setHardTimeout(5)
488 .setIdleTimeout(5)
489 .setActions(action_server)
490 .setMatch(srcServer)
491 .build();
492
493 sw.write(flowAddServerN);
494 logger.info("Server reply rule installed");
495
496 /*
497 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
498 * END OF THE INJECTION OF ...
THE FLOW FOR THE SERVER TO ANY DESTINATION
499 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
500 */
501
502
503 }
504
505
506
507
508
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509 public void insertRuleBenign(IOFSwitch sw, IPv4Address Ip, ...
MacAddress src, MacAddress dst)
510 {
511
512 OFFactory swFactory = sw.getOFFactory();
513 OFActions actions = swFactory.actions();
514
515
516 /*
517 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
518 * FLOW INSERTION FROM ...
ANYONE TO THE SERVER
519 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
520 */
521
522
523
524 /*
525 * Server destined packet is pre-installed ahead of time.*/
526 ArrayList<OFAction> action_any = new ArrayList<OFAction>();
527 OFActionOutput actToServer = actions.buildOutput() // ...
action output for alert from server
528 .setMaxLen(0xFFffFFff)
529 .setPort(OFPort.NORMAL)
530 .build();
531 action_any.add(actToServer);
532
533 Set<OFFlowModFlags> flags = new HashSet<>();
534 flags.add(OFFlowModFlags.SEND_FLOW_REM);
535
536 benignMatch = swFactory.buildMatch() // matching fields ...
of the packet to be acted on for the alert packet
537 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE, EthType.IPv4)
538 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_SRC, src)
539 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_DST, dst)
540 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, Ip)
541 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, server)
542 .setExact(MatchField.IP_PROTO, IpProtocol.TCP)
543 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_DST, ...
TransportPort.of(80))
544 .build();
545
546 OFFlowMod.Builder flowModBuilder = swFactory.buildFlowAdd()
547 .setActions(action_any)
548 .setHardTimeout(3600)
549 .setIdleTimeout(10)
550 .setMatch(benignMatch)
551 .setFlags(flags)
552 .setPriority(32769);
553
554
555 sw.write(flowModBuilder.build());
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556 //sw.write(toServFlow); // added the flow to every switch ...
in the network
557 logger.info("Server flow for the benign client"); // A ...
verbose that the alert has been installed
558
559 /*
560 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
561 * END OF INSTALL FLOW FROM ...
ANYONE TO THE SERVER
562 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
563 */
564
565
566
567 /*
568 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
569 * THIS SECTION INSTALL THE FLOW THAT ...
WILL REMAIN, WHICH IS THE REPLY FROM THE SERVER TO ...
ANY DESTINATION
570 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
571 */
572 ArrayList<OFAction> action_server = new ...
ArrayList<OFAction>();
573 OFActionOutput server_flow = actions.buildOutput() // ...
action output for alert from server
574 .setMaxLen(0xFFffFFff)
575 .setPort(OFPort.NORMAL)
576 .build();
577 action_server.add(server_flow);
578
579
580 Match srcServer = swFactory.buildMatch() // matching ...
fields of the packet to be acted on for the alert packet
581 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE, EthType.IPv4)
582 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_SRC, src)
583 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_DST, dst)
584 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, server)
585 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, Ip)
586 .setExact(MatchField.IP_PROTO, IpProtocol.TCP)
587 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_SRC, ...
TransportPort.of(80))
588 .build();
589
590 OFFlowMod flowAddServerN = swFactory.buildFlowAdd() // ...
setting the parameter of the flow to be added
591 .setBufferId(OFBufferId.NO_BUFFER)
592 .setCookie(U64.of(0))
593 .setPriority(32770)
594 .setHardTimeout(5)
595 .setIdleTimeout(5)
70
596 .setActions(action_server)
597 .setMatch(srcServer)
598 .build();
599
600 sw.write(flowAddServerN);
601 logger.info("Server reply rule to the benign client");
602
603 /*
604 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
605 * END OF THE INJECTION OF ...
THE FLOW FOR THE SERVER TO ANY DESTINATION
606 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
607 */
608
609
610 }
611
612 public void resetConnection(IOFSwitch sw, MacAddress srcMAC, ...
MacAddress dstMAC, IPv4Address srcIp, IPv4Address dstIp, ...
TransportPort srcPort, TransportPort dstPort, int ack, int ...
seq )
613 {
614 /*
615 * Layer 2 frame created
616 */
617 Ethernet l2 = new Ethernet();
618 l2.setSourceMACAddress(srcMAC);
619 l2.setDestinationMACAddress(dstMAC);
620 l2.setEtherType(EthType.IPv4);
621 /*
622 * End of Layer 2 frame created
623 */
624
625 /*
626 * Layer 3 packet created
627 */
628 IPv4 l3 = new IPv4();
629 l3.setSourceAddress(srcIp);
630 l3.setDestinationAddress(dstIp);
631 l3.setTtl((byte) 64);
632 l3.setProtocol(IpProtocol.TCP);
633 /*
634 * End of Layer 3 packet
635 */
636
637 /*
638 * Layer 4 segment created
639 */
640 TCP l4 = new TCP();
641 l4.setSourcePort(srcPort);
642 l4.setDestinationPort(dstPort);
643 l4.setFlags((short) 4);
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644 l4.setSequence(seq);
645 l4.setAcknowledge(ack);
646 /*
647 * End of Layer 4 segment
648 */
649
650 /*
651 * Setting payloads and serialize
652 */
653 l2.setPayload(l3);
654 l3.setPayload(l4);
655
656 byte[] serializedData = l2.serialize();
657
658 OFPacketOut resetOut = sw.getOFFactory().buildPacketOut()
659 .setData(serializedData)
660 .setActions(Collections.singletonList((OFAction) ...
sw.getOFFactory().actions().output(OFPort.NORMAL, ...
0xffFFffFF)))
661 .setInPort(OFPort.CONTROLLER)
662 .build();
663
664 sw.write(resetOut);
665 logger.info("Connection reset hopefully!!");
666 }
667
668 public void insertRuleMalicious(IOFSwitch sw, IPv4Address Ip, ...
MacAddress src, MacAddress dst, TransportPort portSD)
669 {
670 OFFactory swFactory = sw.getOFFactory();
671
672 Match malMatch = swFactory.buildMatch()
673 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE, EthType.IPv4)
674 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, server)
675 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, reportedIpSrc)
676 .setExact(MatchField.IP_PROTO, IpProtocol.TCP)
677 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_DST, TransportPort.of(80))
678 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_SRC, portSD)
679 .build();
680
681 OFFlowMod flowMal = swFactory.buildFlowAdd()
682 .setBufferId(OFBufferId.NO_BUFFER)
683 .setCookie(U64.of(0))
684 .setPriority(32770)
685 .setHardTimeout(100000)
686 .setIdleTimeout(100000)
687 .setMatch(malMatch)
688 .build();
689
690 sw.write(flowMal);
691
692 logger.info("Malicious Rule installed for {} - From the ...
attacker traffic", reportedIpSrc.toString());
693 }
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694
695 public void insertRuleMalicious2(IOFSwitch sw, IPv4Address ...
Ip, MacAddress src, MacAddress dst, TransportPort portSD)
696 {
697 OFFactory swFactory = sw.getOFFactory();
698
699
700 Match malMatch2 = swFactory.buildMatch()
701 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE, EthType.IPv4)
702 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, server)
703 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, reportedIpSrc)
704 .setExact(MatchField.IP_PROTO, IpProtocol.TCP)
705 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_SRC, TransportPort.of(80))
706 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_DST, portSD)
707 .build();
708
709 OFFlowMod flowMal2 = swFactory.buildFlowAdd()
710 .setBufferId(OFBufferId.NO_BUFFER)
711 .setCookie(U64.of(0))
712 .setPriority(32770)
713 .setHardTimeout(100000)
714 .setIdleTimeout(100000)
715 .setMatch(malMatch2)
716 .build();
717
718 sw.write(flowMal2);
719 logger.info("Malicious Rule installed for {} - From the ...
server traffic", reportedIpSrc.toString());
720
721 }
722
723
724
725
726 public void deleteFlow(IOFSwitch sw)
727 {
728
729 /*
730 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
731 * IN THE EVENT OF AN ...
ATTACK THE CONTROLLER DELETES EVERY FLOW TO THE ...
SERVER
732 * ...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
733 */
734
735 OFFlowDeleteStrict deleteFlow = ...
FlowModUtils.toFlowDeleteStrict(toServerFlow);
736 sw.write(deleteFlow);
737 logger.info("Rules deleted, analysis has started");
738
739 /*
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740 * ...
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
741 * END OF THE FLOW TO ...
DELETE EVERY FLOW WITH THE SERVER AS THE DESTINATION
742 * ...
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
743 */
744
745 /*
746 * ...
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
747 * TO MAKE SURE THAT ALL ...
THE FLOWS ARE DELETED
748 * ...
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
749 */
750 //sendBarrier(sw);
751 /*
752 * -------------------------------END OF THAT WAIT, ...
HOPEFULLY THEY ALL GOT ...
DELETED-----------------------------------------------------------
753 */
754 }
755
756 public ArrayList<IPv4Address> benignSort(IPv4Address destination)
757 {
758 ArrayList<IPv4Address> benign = new ArrayList<IPv4Address>();
759 if(!benign.contains(destination))
760 {
761 benign.add(destination);
762 }
763 return benign;
764 }
765
766 public ArrayList<String> altNature(IPv4 altpackt, IPv4Address ...
address)
767 {
768 UDP signature = (UDP) altpackt.getPayload();
769 IPacket pkt = signature.getPayload();
770 byte[] message = pkt.serialize();
771 String data = new String(message);
772 String[] filterSign = data.split(",");
773 ArrayList<String> addSign = new ArrayList<String>();
774 for(String pro : filterSign)
775 {
776
777 if(pro.equalsIgnoreCase("1"))
778 {
779 monitor = true;
780 logger.info(pro);
781
782 }
783 else if(pro.equalsIgnoreCase("0"))
784 {
74
785 monitor = false;
786 logger.info(pro);
787
788 }
789 else if((!pro.equalsIgnoreCase("1")) && ...
(!pro.equalsIgnoreCase("0")))
790 {
791 logger.info(pro);
792 addSign.add(pro);
793 }
794 }
795 logger.info("Signature: {}", addSign);
796 return addSign;
797 }
798
799
800 @Override
801 public net.floodlightcontroller.core.IListener.Command ...
receive(IOFSwitch sw, OFMessage msg,
802 FloodlightContext cntx) {
803
804 //Long srcMacHash = eth.getSourceMACAddress().getLong();
805 OFFactory swFactory = sw.getOFFactory();
806 //ArrayList<OFAction> actionList = new ArrayList<OFAction>();
807 OFActions actions = swFactory.actions();
808 Ethernet eth = ...
IFloodlightProviderService.bcStore.get(cntx, ...
IFloodlightProviderService.CONTEXT_PI_PAYLOAD);
809
810 switch(msg.getType())
811 {
812 case PACKET_IN:
813
814 //OFPacketIn myPacketIn = (OFPacketIn) msg;
815 /* Getters and setters exposed in Ethernet */
816 if(eth.getEtherType() == EthType.IPv4)
817 {
818 MacAddress srcMAC = eth.getSourceMACAddress();
819 MacAddress dstMAC = eth.getDestinationMACAddress();
820 IPv4 ipv4_pkt = (IPv4) eth.getPayload();
821 IPv4Address dstIp = ipv4_pkt.getDestinationAddress();
822 IPv4Address srcIp = ipv4_pkt.getSourceAddress();
823
824
825 if(monitor == false)
826 {
827 // Initial flow for the operation.
828 insertFlows(sw, srcIp);
829 logger.info("MONITOR IS OFF");
830
831 //------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
832 }
833 else if(monitor == true & runonce == 0)
834 {
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835 deleteFlow(sw);
836 runonce++;
837 logger.info("{} + Hey",runonce);
838
839 }
840 else
841 {
842 logger.info("MONITOR IS ON");
843 }
844
845 /*
846 * This rule caters for the signature being sent ...
to the switch and the switch should forward ...
the packet to the controller
847 * which is true when the boolean monitor is false
848 */
849
850
851 if(monitor == false)
852 {
853 if((ipv4_pkt.getProtocol() == IpProtocol.UDP) ...
&& (dstIp.equals(controllerIp)))
854 {
855
856 signat_rs = altNature(ipv4_pkt,dstIp);
857
858 if(signat_rs != null)
859 {
860 logger.info("Hey: {}", signat_rs);
861 logger.info("Signature Gotten");
862
863 }
864 else
865 {
866 logger.info("Signature is empty");
867 }
868
869 }
870 }
871
872 /*
873 * This check and add to a list the IP Addresses ...
of clients that visited the server
874 */
875
876 if((monitor == true) && !(filter.contains(srcIp)))
877 {
878 if((ipv4_pkt.getProtocol() == IpProtocol.TCP) ...
& (dstIp.equals(server)))
879 {
880 TCP tcp = (TCP) ipv4_pkt.getPayload();
881 TransportPort dstPort = ...
tcp.getDestinationPort();
882 TransportPort srcPort = tcp.getSourcePort();
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883 if( dstPort.equals(TransportPort.of(80)))
884 {insertFlowE(sw, srcIp, srcMAC, ...
dstMAC, srcPort);}
885 if(!visited_server.contains(srcIp))
886 {visited_server.add(srcIp);}
887
888 logger.info("Source: {}", srcIp);
889 logger.info("This ip {} visited the ...
server", visited_server.toString());
890
891
892
893
894 logger.info("Rule installed for {}", ...
srcIp.toString());
895 }
896 }
897
898 if((monitor == true) && (benign.contains(srcIp)) ...
&& (ipv4_pkt.getProtocol() == IpProtocol.TCP))
899 {
900 insertRuleBenign(sw, srcIp, srcMAC, dstMAC);
901 }
902
903 if((monitor == true) && (filter.contains(srcIp)) ...
&& (ipv4_pkt.getProtocol() == IpProtocol.TCP))
904 {
905
906 TCP tcp_payload = (TCP) ipv4_pkt.getPayload();
907
908 int seq = tcp_payload.getSequence();
909 int ack = tcp_payload.getAcknowledge() + 2;
910
911 TransportPort srcPt = ...
tcp_payload.getSourcePort();
912 TransportPort dstPt = ...
tcp_payload.getDestinationPort();
913 if(dstPt.equals(TransportPort.of(80)))
914 {
915 insertRuleMalicious(sw, srcIp, srcMAC, ...
dstMAC, srcPt);
916 //resetConnection(sw, dstMAC, srcMAC, ...
server, srcIp, dstPt, srcPt, ack, seq);
917 logger.info(server.toString() + " " + ...
srcIp.toString() + " " + ...
dstPt.toString() + " " + ...
srcPt.toString() );
918 }
919 }
920
921
922 if((monitor == true) && (filter.contains(dstIp)) ...
&& (ipv4_pkt.getProtocol() == IpProtocol.TCP))
923 {
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924 TCP tcp_payload = (TCP) ipv4_pkt.getPayload();
925 int seq = tcp_payload.getSequence();
926 int ack = tcp_payload.getAcknowledge() + 2;
927 TransportPort srcPt = ...
tcp_payload.getSourcePort();
928 TransportPort dstPt = ...
tcp_payload.getDestinationPort();
929 if(srcPt.equals(TransportPort.of(80)))
930 {
931 insertRuleMalicious2(sw, srcIp, srcMAC, ...
dstMAC, dstPt);
932 //resetConnection(sw, srcMAC, dstMAC, ...
server, dstIp, TransportPort.of(80), ...
dstPt, ack, seq );
933 logger.info(server.toString() + " " + ...
dstIp.toString() + " " + ...
srcPt.toString() + " " + ...
dstPt.toString() );
934 }
935
936 }
937
938
939 if((monitor==true) && signat_rs != null)
940 {
941 for(int i = 0; i < signat_rs.size(); i++)
942 {
943 if((ipv4_pkt.getProtocol() == ...
IpProtocol.TCP) && ...
(IPv4AddressWithMask.of(signat_rs.get(i)).contains(dstIp)) ...
&& (visited_server.contains(srcIp)))
944 {
945 if(!profile.containsKey(srcIp) || ...
(profile.isEmpty()))
946 {
947 logger.info("Am here as usual");
948 List<IPv4Address> dsts = new ...
ArrayList<IPv4Address>();
949 dsts.add(dstIp);
950 logger.info(dsts.toString());
951 profile.put(srcIp, dsts);
952 logger.info(profile.toString());
953 }
954 else
955 {
956 for(Map.Entry<IPv4Address, ...
List<IPv4Address>> host: ...
profile.entrySet())
957 {
958 logger.info("Am here as ...
usual-2");
959 if(host.getKey().equals(srcIp))
960 {
961 if(!host.getValue().contains(dstIp))
78
962 {
963 logger.info("Am ...
here as usual-3");
964 host.getValue().add(dstIp);
965 }
966 }
967 }
968
969
970
971
972
973 }
974
975
976
977 /*
978 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
979 * THIS SECTION INSTALL THE ...
FLOW THAT WILL ALLOW THE CONTROLLER TO ...
REGISTER SRC IPS
980 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
981 */
982
983
984 ArrayList<OFAction> action_reg = new ...
ArrayList<OFAction>();
985 OFActionOutput server_reg = ...
actions.buildOutput() // action ...
output for alert from server
986 .setMaxLen(0xFFffFFff)
987 .setPort(OFPort.NORMAL)
988 .build();
989 action_reg.add(server_reg);
990
991
992
993 Match flagSign = ...
swFactory.buildMatch() // matching ...
fields of the packet to be acted ...
on for the alert packet
994 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_TYPE, ...
EthType.IPv4)
995 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_DST, ...
dstIp)
996 .setExact(MatchField.IPV4_SRC, ...
srcIp)
997 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_SRC, ...
srcMAC)
998 .setExact(MatchField.ETH_DST, ...
dstMAC)
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999 .setExact(MatchField.IP_PROTO, ...
IpProtocol.TCP)
1000 .setExact(MatchField.TCP_DST, ...
TransportPort.of(443))
1001 .build();
1002
1003 OFFlowMod flowAddServerR = ...
swFactory.buildFlowAdd() // ...
setting the parameter of the flow ...
to be added
1004 .setBufferId(OFBufferId.NO_BUFFER)
1005 .setCookie(U64.of(0))
1006 .setPriority(32769)
1007 .setHardTimeout(3600)
1008 .setIdleTimeout(10)
1009 .setActions(action_reg)
1010 .setMatch(flagSign)
1011 .build();
1012
1013 sw.write(flowAddServerR);
1014 logger.info("Filtering rule ...
installed");
1015
1016
1017
1018 /*
1019 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1020 * END OF THE ...
INJECTION OF THE FLOW FOR THE SERVER TO ...
ANY DESTINATION
1021 * ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1022 */
1023 }
1024
1025 }
1026
1027
1028 }
1029
1030 }
1031 break;
1032
1033 case FLOW_REMOVED:
1034 logger.info("Am getting it");
1035 OFFlowRemoved flowremoved = (OFFlowRemoved) msg;
1036 Match flowMatch = flowremoved.getMatch();
1037
1038 if(flowMatch.equals(matchOb))
1039 {
1040 logger.info("Reason: {}", flowMatch.toString());
1041 logger.info("Message: {}", flowremoved.toString());
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1042 logger.info("ByteCount: {}, PacketCount: {}", ...
flowremoved.getByteCount().toString(), ...
flowremoved.getPacketCount());
1043 String a = flowMatch.toString();
1044 MacAddress seenSrcMAC = null;
1045 MacAddress seenDstMAC = null;
1046 TransportPort seenSrcPort = null;
1047 TransportPort seenDstPort = null;
1048
1049
1050 int length = a.length();
1051 logger.info("The length = {}", length);
1052 String regSrcMAC = ...
"eth_src=([a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2})";
1053 String regDstMAC = ...
"eth_dst=([a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2})";
1054 String regSrcPort = "tcp_src=(\\d{1,5})";
1055 String regDstPort = "tcp_dst=(\\d{1,5})";
1056 String regSrc = ...
"ipv4_src=(\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3})"; ...
//Regex for id and ipAddress
1057 String regDst = ...
"ipv4_dst=(\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3})"; ...
//Regex for id and ipAddress
1058 String ipFormat = ...
"(\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3})"; ...
//Regex for ipAddress
1059 String macFormat = ...
"([a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2})";
1060 String portFormat = "(\\d{1,5})";
1061 String subString = a.substring(15, length-1);
1062
1063 for(String ab : subString.split(", "))
1064 {
1065 if(ab.matches(regSrcMAC))
1066 {
1067 for(String br : ab.split("="))
1068 {
1069 if(br.matches(macFormat))
1070 {
1071 seenSrcMAC = MacAddress.of(br);
1072 logger.info("Src Mac: {}", br);
1073 }
1074 }
1075 }
1076 else if(ab.matches(regDstMAC))
1077 for(String br : ab.split("="))
1078 {
1079 if(br.matches(macFormat))
1080 {
1081 seenDstMAC = MacAddress.of(br);
1082 logger.info("Dst Mac: {}", br);
1083 }
1084 }
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1085
1086 else if(ab.matches(regSrc))
1087 {
1088 for(String br : ab.split("="))
1089 {
1090
1091 if(br.matches(ipFormat))
1092 {
1093 reportedIpSrc = IPv4Address.of(br);
1094 logger.info("Source Ip: {}", br);
1095 }
1096 }
1097 }
1098 else if(ab.matches(regDst))
1099 {
1100 for(String br : ab.split("="))
1101 {
1102
1103 if(br.matches(ipFormat))
1104 {
1105 reportedIpDst = IPv4Address.of(br);
1106 logger.info("Destination Ip: {}", br);
1107 }
1108 }
1109 }
1110 else if(ab.matches(regSrcPort))
1111 {
1112 for(String br : ab.split("="))
1113 {
1114
1115 if(br.matches(portFormat))
1116 {
1117 int br_v = Integer.parseInt(br);
1118 seenSrcPort = TransportPort.of(br_v);
1119 logger.info("Src Port: {}", br);
1120 }
1121 }
1122 }
1123 else if(ab.matches(regDstPort))
1124 {
1125 for(String br : ab.split("="))
1126 {
1127
1128 if(br.matches(portFormat))
1129 {
1130 int br_v = Integer.parseInt(br);
1131 seenDstPort = TransportPort.of(br_v);
1132 logger.info("Dest Port: {}", br);
1133 }
1134 }
1135 }
1136
1137 }
1138 /*
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1139 * Extract the source IPAddress of the reported flow ...
that timed out in the flow table
1140 * this is reported to the controller by the switch.
1141 */
1142
1143 for(Map.Entry<IPv4Address, List<IPv4Address>> host: ...
profile.entrySet())
1144 {
1145 int benign_size = 0;
1146 if(host.getKey().equals(reportedIpSrc))
1147 {
1148
1149 if(host.getValue().size() ≥ 1)
1150 {
1151 benign.add(host.getKey());
1152 benign_size =host.getValue().size();
1153 }
1154 }
1155
1156 logger.info(profile.toString());
1157 logger.info(benign.toString() + " " + "Good ...
client" + " :count= " + benign_size);
1158 }
1159
1160 if(benign.contains(reportedIpSrc))
1161 {
1162 logger.info("Found in the list: {}", reportedIpSrc);
1163 insertRuleBenign(sw, reportedIpSrc, seenSrcMAC, ...
seenDstMAC);
1164 logger.info("Installed rule for benign IP: {}", ...
reportedIpSrc);
1165 logger.info(benign.toString() + " - Benign List");
1166 }
1167 else
1168 {
1169 filter.add(reportedIpSrc);
1170 insertRuleMalicious(sw, reportedIpSrc, ...
seenSrcMAC, seenDstMAC, seenSrcPort);
1171
1172 }
1173
1174
1175
1176
1177 }
1178 else if(flowMatch.equals(benignMatch))
1179 {
1180 logger.info("Reason: {}", flowMatch.toString());
1181 String a = flowMatch.toString();
1182 MacAddress seenSrcMAC = null;
1183 MacAddress seenDstMAC = null;
1184 TransportPort seenSrcPort = null;
1185 TransportPort seenDstPort = null;
1186
83
1187
1188 int length = a.length();
1189 logger.info("The length = {}", length);
1190 String regSrcMAC = ...
"eth_src=([a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2})";
1191 String regDstMAC = ...
"eth_dst=([a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2})";
1192 String regSrcPort = "tcp_src=(\\d{1,5})";
1193 String regDstPort = "tcp_dst=(\\d{1,5})";
1194 String regSrc = ...
"ipv4_src=(\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3})"; ...
//Regex for id and ipAddress
1195 String regDst = ...
"ipv4_dst=(\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3})"; ...
//Regex for id and ipAddress
1196 String ipFormat = ...
"(\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3}.?\\d{1,3})"; ...
//Regex for ipAddress
1197 String macFormat = ...
"([a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2}:?[a-f0-9]{2})";
1198 String portFormat = "(\\d{1,5})";
1199 String subString = a.substring(15, length-1);
1200
1201 for(String ab : subString.split(", "))
1202 {
1203 if(ab.matches(regSrcMAC))
1204 {
1205 for(String br : ab.split("="))
1206 {
1207 if(br.matches(macFormat))
1208 {
1209 seenSrcMAC = MacAddress.of(br);
1210 logger.info("Src Mac: {} - BENIGN", br);
1211 }
1212 }
1213 }
1214 else if(ab.matches(regDstMAC))
1215 for(String br : ab.split("="))
1216 {
1217 if(br.matches(macFormat))
1218 {
1219 seenDstMAC = MacAddress.of(br);
1220 logger.info("Dst Mac: {} - BENIGN", br);
1221 }
1222 }
1223
1224 else if(ab.matches(regSrc))
1225 {
1226 for(String br : ab.split("="))
1227 {
1228
1229 if(br.matches(ipFormat))
1230 {
1231 reportedIpSrc = IPv4Address.of(br);
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1232 logger.info("Source Ip: {} - BENIGN", ...
br);
1233 }
1234 }
1235 }
1236 else if(ab.matches(regDst))
1237 {
1238 for(String br : ab.split("="))
1239 {
1240
1241 if(br.matches(ipFormat))
1242 {
1243 reportedIpDst = IPv4Address.of(br);
1244 logger.info("Destination Ip: {} - ...
BENIGN", br);
1245 }
1246 }
1247 }
1248 else if(ab.matches(regSrcPort))
1249 {
1250 for(String br : ab.split("="))
1251 {
1252
1253 if(br.matches(portFormat))
1254 {
1255 int br_v = Integer.parseInt(br);
1256 seenSrcPort = TransportPort.of(br_v);
1257 logger.info("Src Port: {} - BENIGN", br);
1258 }
1259 }
1260 }
1261 else if(ab.matches(regDstPort))
1262 {
1263 for(String br : ab.split("="))
1264 {
1265
1266 if(br.matches(portFormat))
1267 {
1268 int br_v = Integer.parseInt(br);
1269 seenDstPort = TransportPort.of(br_v);
1270 logger.info("Dest Port: {} - BENIGN", ...
br);
1271 }
1272 }
1273 }
1274
1275 }
1276
1277 // * Extract the source IPAddress of the reported ...
flow that timed out in the flow table
1278 // * this is reported to the controller by the switch.
1279
1280
1281 if(benign.contains(reportedIpSrc))
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1282 {
1283 logger.info("Expired Supposed Benign IP: {}", ...
reportedIpSrc);
1284 benign.remove(reportedIpSrc);
1285 logger.info(benign.toString() + " - Benign List");
1286 logger.info("IP to be reassessed on entry: {}", ...
reportedIpSrc);
1287 }
1288
1289
1290 }
1291 else{
1292 logger.info("Flow Removed not needed");
1293 }
1294
1295
1296 break;
1297 default:
1298 break;
1299 }
1300
1301 return Command.CONTINUE;
1302
1303 }
1304
1305 }
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